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This dissertation combines three essays on the industrial organization and the industrial 
organization of education markets. These three essays study how the strategic behavior of firms 
influences market outcomes and consumer decisions. The first chapter examines the 
manufacturer’s product variety and its relation to the manufacturer’s bargaining power with 
retailers. The second chapter focuses on the empirical analysis of the economic impact of new 
product introduction. The third chapter considers the role of state laws in student’s school choice. 
The first essay, co-authored with Dr. Philip G. Gayle, analyzes how a manufacturer’s 
preexisting number of distinct product lines, and the number of horizontally differentiated products 
within each line affects its bargaining power with retailers, where a manufacturer’s bargaining 
power is measured by the share of variable profits retained by the manufacturer when contracting 
with retailers to sell its products. We find that a manufacturer’s expanded provision of horizontally 
differentiated products under a given line and the number of distinct product lines do not have a 
statistically significant impact on its bargaining power with retailers, i.e., do not change the 
manufacturer’s share of the profit pie with retailers. However, consistent with existing theory, we 
find evidence that product menu expansions increase the manufacturer’s variable profit, no doubt 
owing to an expansion in the size of the full variable profit pie shared with retailers. As such, the 
evidence suggests that it is profit-maximizing for manufacturers to product proliferate, even 
though this strategy has no effect on its bargaining power with retailers. 
In the second essay, co-authored with Dr. Philip G. Gayle, we investigate the market 
impacts associated with the introduction of Greek yogurt in the U.S. yogurt industry. With the 
entrance of Chobani to the U.S. yogurt market in 2007, the popularity of Greek yogurt has risen 
widely in the U.S. To assess the market impacts of the introduction of Greek yogurt, first, we 
  
estimate a structural econometric model of demand and supply, then use the estimated model to 
perform counterfactual experiments where we remove Greek-type yogurt from the consumer’s 
choice set. Our analyses reveal that the presence of Greek-type products causes the price of Non-
Greek yogurt products to be lower by a mean 39.85% and increases the quantity demand of Non-
Greek products by a mean 45.22%. In addition, we find the fraction of consumers choosing not to 
purchase yogurt products decreases, which shows that the introduction of Greek-type yogurt has a 
market expansionary effect on the U.S. yogurt market. 
Student loan default is an important policy concern; for example, the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) allows the U.S. Department of Education to 
suspend payments on student loans, stop collections on defaulted loans and use a 0% interest rate 
due to economic challenges surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic. One policy aimed at reducing 
student loan default that has received little attention by researchers is the 1990 recommendation 
by the U.S. Department of Education that states should “deny professional licenses to defaulters 
until they take steps to repayment”. In the third essay, co-authored with Dr. Philip G. Gayle and 
Dr. Amanda Gaulke, we study the impacts of state laws that deny, revoke, or suspend state licenses 
due to student loan default (LSD laws). We estimate a structural econometric model of students’ 
college choice and find that students become more sensitive to cohort default rates (CDRs) after 
LSD laws are implemented. Despite the student response putting downward pressure on CDRs, 
schools’ response may counteract that effect due to facing higher marginal cost to reduce default. 
Thus, we find mixed results of LSD laws’ impact on CDRs: an overall increase in CDRs for some 
states, but an overall decrease for some states. 
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Chapter 1 - Strawberry or Plain Yogurt? Product Line Expansions 
and Manufacturer’s Bargaining Power with Retailers 
1.1 Introduction 
New product introductions that extend the firm’s product line have become a popular 
competition strategy of product managers (Kekre and Srinivasan (1990); Kadiyali et al. (1998), 
Draganska and Jain (2005)).1 With new product introductions, firms can choose to introduce new 
product lines or expand the existing product lines to extract more consumer surplus. For example, 
Apple Inc. introduced a series of iPhone models into the smartphone market. At any given point 
in time, the series of Apple smartphones available to consumers, currently iPhone 6 to iPhone11, 
differ in price and quality given the fact that consumers differ in their intensity of preference for 
quality (Moorthy (1984)). Adopting a “vertical” line extension strategy, which corresponds to 
establishing product lines of differing quality, can better enable firms to target different market 
segments distinguished by consumers’ differing willingness to pay for a change in quality (Mussa 
and Rosen (1978); Lancaster (1990)). 
On the other hand, firms can offer new products that differ in some attributes, but do not 
differ in overall quality and price; yet these new introductions may serve as effective competitive 
tools for the firms. For example, Unilever & Pepsi Co introduced Lipton Iced Tea and Diet Lipton 
Iced Tea products. These two products have similar price and quality, but vary in other attributes, 
primarily sugar content, that do not have unanimous preference rankings across consumers, 
making this an example of a “horizontal” product line extension. With the help of horizontal 
 
1 Villas-Boas (1998) shows the theoretical foundation for understanding how a manufacturer designs a product line 
within the distribution channel.  
2 
product line extensions, firms can use a product proliferation strategy as a substitute for price 
competition (Connor (1981)). Increased variety and longer product lines allow for a firm to capture 
consumers with heterogeneous tastes. Hence, firms have the advantage to use product proliferation 
as a defensive mechanism to protect themselves against competitors (Connor (1981); Lancaster 
(1979); Bayus and Putsis (1999)). 
The yogurt industry provides ideal examples of product proliferation strategies since there 
are constant brand and flavor introductions. Several yogurt manufacturers each carries multiple 
product lines and offers different flavors under each line. For instance, General Mills carries yogurt 
product lines such as Yoplait, Liberte, and Annie’s, Mountain High. These product lines are sold 
under different brand names and price, seeking to distinguish themselves from each other for the 
purpose of better segmenting consumers. On the other hand, the actual yogurt products within each 
product line, are horizontally differentiated, that is, products within a given line sell for a similar 
price and are typically distinguished by attributes, such as flavor, that are not unanimously 
preferred by consumers. 
Profitability of the distribution channel depends on the size of the total margins, and how 
these margins are split between manufacturers and retailers. The size of the profit pie is determined 
by the ability of manufacturers and retailers to extract surplus from consumers by charging higher 
prices. However, the slices of the profit pie going to manufacturers and retailers respectively are a 
reflection of their relative bargaining power in interacting with each other (Draganska et al. 
(2010)). By offering a greater number of product lines with promotions, manufacturers can 
increase market share and profitability of their products (Lancaster (1979); Kekre and Srinivasan 
(1990)), and perhaps their bargaining power with retailers. In other words, while the size of the 
profit pie likely increases with a greater number of product lines and perhaps with a greater number 
3 
of horizontally differentiated products within each line, which in turn likely increases 
manufacturer’s profit, it is not clear whether manufacturers’ share of the profit pie also increases. 
When Chobani entered the U.S. yogurt market in 2007, it had a single product line (brand) with a 
large number of flavors. A recent website search shows that Chobani now offers eleven different 
product lines with a large number of flavors within each line.2 While Chobani’s expanded product 
lines, and expanded flavors within each line, are likely to have positive impacts on its profit, did 
these product expansions increased its share of the profit pie, i.e., its bargaining power with 
retailers? 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the extent to which the preexisting 
number of distinct product lines, as well as the preexisting number of horizontally differentiated 
products within each product line influence manufacturers’ bargaining power with retailers. To 
achieve our objective, we follow the general framework of Draganska et al. (2010). Our study 
focuses on the yogurt industry since this industry provides ideal examples of varying degrees of 
horizontal product differentiation and product line introduction across several manufacturers. 
Our research methodology involves three distinct steps. In the first step, we estimate a 
differentiated products consumer demand model using scanner data on yogurt sales at supermarket 
and drug store retail outlets. Given demand parameter estimates, in the second step we use a 
supply-side model of Nash bargaining in which each manufacturer-retailer pair negotiates over the 
retailer carrying in its store the manufacturer’s group of products. A supply-side model of Nash 
bargaining over relevant product groups is more appropriate for the objectives of our study, and 
contrasts with the assumed product-by-product negotiations in Draganska et al. (2010) and other 
studies. The empirical model of Nash bargaining over relevant product groups is used for 
 
2 https://www.chobani.com/products/, accessed (December 19, 2019). 
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estimating parameters that capture the relative bargaining power between manufacturer-retailer 
pairs. With parameter estimates of relative bargaining power between manufacturer-retailer pairs 
in hand, in the third step we use a sequence of linear regression models to estimate the influence 
of the preexisting number of distinct product lines (brands), and the preexisting number of 
horizontally differentiated products within product lines, on manufacturers’ bargaining power with 
retailers. 
Our analysis adds to the literature that studies manufacturer-retailer relative bargaining 
powers within the vertical channel (Draganska et al. (2010); Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012); 
Doudchenko and Yurukoglu (2016); Bonnet and Bouamra-Mechemache (2015); Bonnet et al. 
(2015); Grennan (2013); Grennan (2014); Haucap et al. (2013); Ellickson et al. (2018)). Earlier 
studies in this literature focused on the determinants of the retailer’s bargaining power. In this 
study, we empirically investigate the basic assumption of Lancaster (1979) and Kekre and 
Srinivasan (1990) that offering many product lines and assortment increases the market share, 
profitability and indirectly the bargaining power of the manufacturer with retailers. 
For the yogurt industry, our results indicate that bargaining power is mostly on the 
manufacturer side. We find that relative bargaining power varies depending on the manufacturer-
retailer pair. Surprisingly, we find that: (i) expanding existing product lines horizontally; and (ii) 
expanding the number of unique brands, have no statistically discernable impact on the 
manufacturer’s bargaining power with retailers. However, consistent with theoretical predictions 
in Lancaster (1979) and Kekre and Srinivasan (1990), we find evidence suggesting that it is still 
optimal for manufacturers to choose to product proliferate horizontally and introduce a greater 
number of unique brands, even though these product proliferation strategies have no impact on the 
manufacturer’s bargaining power with retailers. 
5 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the data; 
Section 3 outlines an econometric model of the market for yogurt; Section 4 explains the estimation 
and identification strategies; Section 5 discusses the results; and Section 6 provides the main 
conclusions of the paper. 
 
1.2 Data 
This study primarily uses data made available by the U.S. marketing firm, Information 
Resources Inc. (IRI). IRI collected data by using scanning devices from a sample of stores 
belonging to different retail chains located in various areas of the U.S. The data consist of weekly 
prices and the total sales of almost all brands of yogurt sold in the U.S. We use data in year 2012.3  
We chose to delineate the geographic market areas by county, which is often a smaller 
geographic area compared to IRI designated geographic market areas. In our study, each market is 
defined as the unique combination of county, month and year. Each product in the dataset is 
defined as a unique combination of non-price characteristics, such as, yogurt style (Greek vs. non-
Greek), brands, flavor/scent, organic information, and packaging type. Thus, packaged yogurt 
under the same brand with a different yogurt style, and organic information are designated as 
different products (e.g. Organic Greek yogurt with a strawberry flavor is a different product than 
Organic Greek yogurt with a blueberry flavor in a given retailer store). For each product in each 
market, we aggregate weekly data up to monthly sales and dollar value revenue from sales. The 
average retail product prices are computed by dividing monthly sales revenue by monthly unit 
sales. 
 
3 Data are available from 2001 to 2012.  
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We use a discrete choice demand model similar to Villas-Boas (2007), which requires 
computing product shares, as well as the share of an outside option in each market. First, we 
describe how potential market size is measured in this study, which is used in computing product 
shares and the share of the outside option in each market. Following Villas-Boas (2007), we 
assumed per capita yogurt consumption for each individual in the U.S. is half of the per capita 
yogurt consumption per month. After obtaining the population of each county from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS), we multiplied the number of adult population with half of the per capita 
yogurt consumption, which yields the measure we use for potential market size for each defined 
market, respectively. The observed share associated with each product in a given market is 
computed by dividing the product’s unit sales by the market’s potential size measure. The observed 
share of the outside option is computed as one minus the sum of observed shares across products 
within a given market. Table 1.1 lists and defines the variables used in the analysis. 
 
 Table 1.1 Description of available variables 
 
Name Description 
Price Average monthly prices in dollar per ounce.  
Market Share (𝑆𝑗) Monthly market shares for each product (𝑆𝑗) are computed as the total quantity sold 
divided by the potential market size. 
Feature count Counts feature(s) (i.e., frequent shopper program, large size advertisement) 
occurred for product during that month. 
Display count Counts the special display(s) (e.g. end aisle, lobby) occurred for each product 
during that month. 
Sugar Sugar price per ounce 
Protein Protein information per ounce of yogurt 
Organic Information Dummy=1 if the product is organic, zero otherwise 
7 
Yogurt style  Dummy=1 if the product is Greek yogurt, zero otherwise 
Total Sugar Amount of sugar per ounce of yogurt 
Sodium Amount of sodium per ounce of yogurt 
Total Fat Amount of total fat per ounce of yogurt 
 
For the empirical analysis, we need to supplement the IRI-dataset with data on non-price 
product characteristics and consumer demographics. Data on non-price product characteristics are 
collected based on nutritional facts from label reads of each brand, such as calorie, sugar, fat, and 
protein contents, under the assumption that those characteristics did not change over the observed 
period. Assuming an individual's income is presumably relevant to his/her demand for yogurt, we 
have drawn income information of consumers from the U.S. Census Integrated Public 
Microdataset Sample (IPUMS). Our model considers the interactions of consumer demographics 
with the price and select non-price product characteristics, such as yogurt style, i.e. Greek versus 
non-Greek style. 
  Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics for single-pack, 6-ounces yogurt products. 
The average price of yogurt per ounce is $0.149. Data on the price for sugar, a cost-shifting 
variable, are obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) database.4 
 
4 https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/sugar-and-sweeteners-yearbook-tables.aspx , accessed (December 
19,2019). 
 Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics of single-pack, 6-ounces yogurt products 
 
Description Mean S.E. Min Max 
Average price ($/ounce) 0.149 0.0005 0.05 0.55 
Aggregate sales (ounces) 1191.26 17.93 6 35154 
Sugar prices (cents/ounce) 68.935 0.004 67.9 69.6 




1.2.1 Relevant Measures of Manufacturer’s Product Line(s) 
To assess the influence of number of distinct product lines (product line width), and number 
of horizontally differentiated products within product lines (product line depth) on the bargaining 
power of manufacturers, we constructed measures of product line width and product line depth, 
respectively. 
Supposedly, the number of flavors offered under each brand of a given manufacturer can 
increase consumers’ brand loyalty and willingness to pay for that manufacturer's products. The 
idea is that if the manufacturer differentiates itself from the other competitors horizontally, then it 
can increase consumer loyalty and demand, and perhaps in turn charge higher price-cost margins. 
We construct measures of manufacturers’ product line depth using the number of flavors under 
each product line of a given manufacturer. Some manufacturers carry more than one product line; 
however, our empirical framework requires assigning to each manufacturer a single value 
measuring their product line depth. Thus, we define two alternative measures of a manufacturer’s 
product line depth: (i) Product Line Depth - Maximum, which is the number of flavors offered 
within the given manufacturer’s largest product line; and (ii) Product Line Depth - Average, which 
is the average number of flavors offered across the given manufacturer’s product lines.  
Due to product attribute (tangible and intangible) differences across unique brands, a 
greater number of brands, synonymous here with product lines, can better enable firms to capture 
Display 0.045 0.002 0 4 
Total Sugar (per ounce) 2.85 0.094 0 6.22 
Protein (per ounce) 1.236 0.0509 0.5 2.64 
Sodium (per ounce) 14.66 0.037 0.66 45.28 
Total Fat (per ounce) 0.227 0.003 0 2.5 
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distinct segments of the market. Thus, we hypothesize that manufacturers with relatively more 
brands have greater bargaining power with a given retailer. We define Product Line Width as the 
number of brands carried by each manufacturer. 
To ensure that we use measures of product line depth and product line width that are 
exogenous, or at least pre-determined, within the context of our empirical bargaining model, we 
constructed these variables by using manufacturers’ product menu information from January 
through April in year 2012, which is a period preceding the period used for actual econometric 
estimation of the demand and supply-side bargaining models. Table A1 in Appendix A lists 
manufacturers and their available brands. The demand and supply-side bargaining models are 
estimated using sales of products from May through December of 2012. Table 1.3 provides 
descriptive statistics on product line width, product line depth and industry sales share, 
respectively, across manufacturers in our data sample. 
Column (1) of Table 1.3 shows the number of product lines for each manufacturer. Among 
the 30 manufacturers in our data sample, nineteen of them (i.e., 63 percent of them) offer a single 
product line; nine of them (i.e., 30 percent of them) offer two product lines; one (i.e., 3.33 percent 
of them) offers seven product lines; and one manufacturer (i.e., 3.33 percent of them) offers nine 
product lines.  
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.3 show manufacturers Product Line Depth - Maximum and 
Product Line Depth – Average, respectively. Private labels (PL) products - under the assumption 
of each PL is produced by a common, outside manufacturer - offers 89 different flavors; while 
Chobani offers a single product line with 16 flavors; General Mill’s largest product line has 27 
flavors, with an average 11 flavors per line; and Group Dannon’s largest product line offers 17 
flavors, with an average 9 flavors per line.  
10 
The last column of Table 1.3 shows the industry sales share of each manufacturer in the 
data. Based on the share of industry sales data, Chobani has the highest share of industry sales, 
followed by Private Label, General Mills and Group Dannon, respectively. 
 
     Table 1.3 Each manufacturer’s product line width, product line depth and industry sales share 
 
Producer Name 









Chobani Inc. 1 16 16 34.0214 
Private Label 1 89 89 26.2043 
General Mills Inc. 7 27 10.71 21.3147 
Group Dannon 9 17 8.56 16.4584 
Liberty Products Inc. 2 6 5 0.3047 
Johanna Foods Inc 2 18 10 0.2977 
WhiteWave 1 5 5 0.2839 
Fage 1 1 1 0.2180 
Turtle Mountain Inc 1 7 7 0.1400 
Wallaby Yogurt Company Inc. 2 14 9.5 0.1139 
Tula Food Inc 1 6 6 0.1097 
The Hain Celestial Group Inc. 2 4 4 0.0747 
Tillamook  1 9 9 0.0728 
WholeSoy & Co 1 7 7 0.0614 
Cascade Fresh 2 11 6.5 0.0567 
Redwood Hill Farm 1 5 5 0.0550 
Dean Foods 1 4 4 0.0518 
Alpina 2 1 1 0.0383 
Prairie Farms 1 11 1.22 0.0293 
H P Food Inc 2 7 7 0.0202 
Greece By Tyras 1 6 6 0.0177 
Emmi Roth Inc. 1 7 7 0.0156 
Green Mountain Creamery 1 5 5 0.0149 
Kalona Organics 1 2 2 0.0072 
Maple Hill Creamery 1 2 2 0.0058 
Schreiber Foods Inc. 1 4 4 0.0047 
Mehadrin Dairy 2 4 3 0.0033 
National Dairy Holdings 2 15 9.5 0.0014 
Green Valley Organics 1 2 2 0.0011 
Springfield Creamery 1 5 5 0.0003 
Notes: Product line width and Product line depth measurements are computed based on manufacturers’ product menu 
information from January through April of year 2012.  
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1.3 Econometric Model of the Yogurt Market 
We model the market for yogurt using a structural model of demand and strategic behavior 
of retailers and manufacturers. The empirical strategy is as follows. First, we estimate consumers' 
preferences in the yogurt market. Consumers in a market face a choice set that includes the offers 
of different yogurt products, and each product is defined as a combination of non-price 
characteristics. Using demand estimates, along with an assumed static Nash equilibrium price-
setting behavior among downstream retailers, we recover retail price-cost margins. By using 
exogenous cost-shifting variables of yogurt production within a supply-side manufacturer-retailer 
Nash bargaining framework, we estimate parameters that measure the relative bargaining power 
of manufacturers with respect to retailers for each manufacturer-retailer pair. In the final step of 
the empirical strategy, we use a sequence of linear regression models to estimate the influence of 
number of distinct product lines, and number of horizontally differentiated products within product 
lines on manufacturers’ bargaining power with retailers. 
 
1.3.1 Demand Model 
We use a random coefficients logit model to estimate the demand and related price 
elasticities (Berry and Pakes (2001)). Suppose there are M markets, m=1,. . .,M and in each market, 
there are 𝐿𝑚  potential consumers. A typical consumer i can choose to either buy one of the J 
differentiated products, j=1,. . .,J or otherwise choose the outside good (j=0), allowing for the 
possibility of consumer i not buying one of the J marketed goods. Therefore, consumer i chooses 
between  J+1 alternatives in market m during time t. Consumer i’s conditional indirect utility for 
the outside good is 𝑢𝑖0𝑡 = 𝑖0𝑚𝑡, while for products j=1,. . .,J  it is: 
12 
where in equation (1), 𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑡 is a vector of observed non-price product characteristics. The 
parameter vector 𝛽𝑖 contains consumer-specific valuations for the product characteristics. 
Parameter 𝛼𝑖  captures consumer-specific disutility of price. 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 is the price of yogurt per ounce; 
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑚 captures county-specific fixed effects; 𝑣𝑡 captures time (month) fixed effects; 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑗 
captures product-specific fixed effects; and 𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡  is the unobserved (by the econometrician) brand 
characteristics (i.e., quality, reputation, etc.) that have an impact on consumer utility, whereas 𝑖𝑗𝑚𝑡 
is a mean-zero stochastic error term. 
The distribution of consumer-specific taste parameters, 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛼𝑖 , is specified as follows: 
 
 
In Equation (2), 𝛼 and 𝛽 parameters are the mean marginal utilities of respective observable 
product characteristics. 𝐷𝑖 is an m-dimensional column vector of demographic variables, while 𝜗𝑖  
is a k-dimensional column vector that captures unobserved consumer characteristics. 𝜙 is a 𝑘 × 𝑚 
matrix of parameters that measure how taste characteristics vary with demographics, and 𝛴 is a 
𝑘 × 𝑘 diagonal matrix with a set of parameters, 𝜎𝑘, on the diagonal that measures the variation in 
consumer tastes for respective product attributes due to random shocks. In our estimation, we 
consider income as a demographic variable, and we expressed the demographic variable in 
deviation from its respective mean. Thus, the mean of 𝐷𝑖 is zero. Following Nevo (2000b), we 
assume that 𝜗𝑖 has a standard multivariate normal distribution, 𝜗𝑖~N(0,1). The assumptions 
  










) + 𝜙𝐷𝑖 + 𝛴𝜗𝑖 
 
 
  (2) 
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regarding 𝐷𝑖 and 𝜗𝑖 along with equation (2) imply that, the mean of 𝛼𝑖 is 𝛼, and the mean of 𝛽𝑖 is  
𝛽, while variances of these consumer-specific marginal utilities are equal to the square of the 
elements on the main diagonal of 𝛴. 
We can break down the indirect utility into a mean utility, 𝛿𝑗𝑚𝑡 =  𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 +
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑚 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡, and a deviation from this mean utility 
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑚𝑡(𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑡 , 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜗𝑖; 𝜙, 𝛴 ) = [𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡, 𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑡](𝜙𝐷𝑖 + 𝛴𝜗𝑖). As such, the indirect utility can be re-
written as: 
 
For computational tractability, the idiosyncratic error term 𝑖𝑗𝑚𝑡 is assumed to be governed 
by an independent and identically distributed extreme value density. Individual i’s probability of 
buying product j in market m at time t is as follows: 
The market share of product j in market m at time t is given by: 
 
where d𝐹(𝐷)̂ and 𝑑𝐹(𝑣) are population distribution functions for consumer demographics 
and random taste shocks assumed to be independently distributed. For the integral in Equation (5), 
  






𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛿𝑗𝑚𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑚𝑡)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
𝐽𝑚𝑡

















there is no closed-form solution. Thus, it must be approximated numerically by using random 
draws from 𝐹(𝐷)̂ and 𝐹(𝑣). 
Finally, the demand for product j is given by: 
where in equation (6), 𝐿𝑚 is  a measure of market size in a given county; 𝑠𝑗𝑚𝑡(𝑥, 𝑝, 𝜉; 𝑑) 
is the model predicted share of product j; 𝑥 , p, and ξ are vectors of observed non-price 
characteristics, price and the unobserved vector of product characteristics, respectively; and 
𝑑=( 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑚, 𝑣𝑡, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑗, 𝜙, 𝛴) is a vector of demand parameters to be estimated. 
 
1.3.2 Supply Side of the Model 
We consider the vertical structure of the yogurt industry as consisting of 𝑛𝑓 upstream 
manufacturers and 𝑛𝑟  downstream retailers. Each upstream manufacturer produces a set of 
products, 𝐺𝑓, and each downstream retailer sells a set of products, 𝑅𝑟. A given market consists of 
J differentiated products. The marginal cost a manufacturer incurs in producing product j is 
denoted by 𝑚𝑐𝑗
𝑓
, while the marginal cost a retailer incurs in offering the product to consumers is 
denoted as 𝑚𝑐𝑗
𝑟. The retail price of product j is denoted as 𝑝𝑗, and the wholesale price the retailer 
pays the manufacturer for the product is denoted as 𝑝𝑗
𝑤. To simplify notation, we drop the time 
subscripts for the remainder of this section. 
Retailer’s profit function is given by: 
  




 𝜋𝑟(𝑝) = ∑[𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑗
𝑤 − 𝑚𝑐𝑗






The profit of manufacturer f from all products sold to retailers is denoted by: 
where Γ𝑗 ≡ 𝑝𝑗
𝑤 − 𝑚𝑐𝑗
𝑓
 represents the manufacturer’s markup on product j. 
As in Draganska et al. (2010), first, we derive the retail margins under the assumption of 
retailers in the yogurt market choosing final prices based on Bertrand-Nash competition. We 
subsequently describe the wholesale price equilibrium under the assumption that upstream 




Each retailer r chooses retail prices for the products it sells to maximize its profit, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝). 
The resulting first-order conditions are: 
We can conveniently recover the set of retail markups by re-writing the above equation in 
matrix form. To do so, we define a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix that characterizes retailers’ ownership structure of 
the products in the market. Let 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix  𝑇𝑟 have a general element, 𝑇𝑟(𝑘, 𝑗), equal to 1 if 
product 𝑘 and 𝑗 are sold by the same retailer, and 0 otherwise. Second, let ∆𝑟 be the 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix 
                                                    = ∑ (𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑗
𝑤 − 𝑚𝑐𝑗
𝑟)  ×   [𝐿 ×  𝑠𝑗(𝑝)𝑗 𝜖𝑅𝑟 ]                              
 𝜋𝐺𝑓
𝑓
(𝑝( 𝑝𝑤)) = ∑[𝑝𝑗
𝑤 − 𝑚𝑐𝑗
𝑓




                                               = ∑ [Γ𝑗  ×   𝐿 ×  𝑠𝑗  (𝑝( 𝑝
𝑤))𝑗 𝜖𝐺𝑓 ]                              
(8) 





  𝑘 𝜖𝑅𝑟 = 0  ∀ 𝑗 
(9) 
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that captures the response of product share to retail prices, i.e., matrix ∆𝑟 contains first-order partial 





















In vector notation, the first-order conditions characterized by equation (9) implies that the 
𝐽 × 1 vector of retail markups (𝛾) is given by the following expression: 
                                  𝛾 ≡ 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑟 = −(𝑇𝑟 ∗ 𝛥𝑟)
−1  ×  𝑠(𝑝)          (10) 
where 𝑝, 𝑝𝑤, 𝑚𝑐𝑟,  and  𝑠(∙) are 𝐽 × 1 vectors of retail prices, wholesale prices, retail 
marginal costs, and product shares respectively; while 𝑇𝑟 ∗ 𝛥𝑟 represents element-by-element 
multiplication of the two matrices. 
 
Wholesale Margins 
The equilibrium wholesale prices for a set of products are derived from the bilateral 
bargaining problem between a manufacturer and a retailer. Manufacturer f will negotiate with each 
retailer to either carry the entire group of products, 𝐺𝑓𝑟 , or none in the group, where 𝐺𝑓𝑟 ⊂ 𝐺𝑓. 
Each manufacturer and retailer pair maximizes the Nash product:  
  
[𝜋𝐺𝑓𝑟













𝑓 (𝑝𝑤) is manufacturer f’s profit and 𝜋𝐺𝑓𝑟
𝑟 (𝑝𝑤) retailer r’s profit for the group of products 
𝐺𝑓𝑟 . Note that the product-by- product bargaining framework in Draganska et al. (2010) and other 
studies is a special case of the product group bargaining framework used in this paper. In particular, 
the framework in this paper yields a product-by-product bargaining framework in the case where 
𝐺𝑓𝑟 always contains a single unique element, i.e., 𝐺𝑓𝑟 = 𝑗 for all fr pairs and j. 
 During negotiations, each player earns its disagreement payoff 𝑑𝐺𝑓𝑟
𝑟  and 𝑑𝐺𝑓𝑟
𝑓
, plus a share 
of 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟 ∈  [0,1] of the incremental gain from trade going to the retailer, and 1 − 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟  going to the 
manufacturer. Here, 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟 is the bargaining power of the retailer and 1 − 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟 is the bargaining 
power of the manufacturer. The manufacturer’s profit obtained from the group of products,  𝐺𝑓𝑟, 
is given as: 
where 𝛤𝑗 ≡ (𝑝𝑗
𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑗
𝑓
) defines manufacturer’s markup on product j. Retailer r’s profit 
obtained from the group of products, 𝐺𝑓𝑟, is given as: 
 
 𝜋𝐺𝑓𝑟
𝑓 (𝑝𝑤) = ∑ (𝑝𝑗
𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑗
𝑓
) ×  𝐿 × 𝑠𝑗(𝑝(𝑝
𝑤))
𝑗 ∈ 𝐺𝑓𝑟









𝑟 (𝑝𝑤) = ∑ (𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑗
𝑤 −𝑚𝑐𝑗
𝑟) ×  𝐿 ×  𝑠𝑗(𝑝)
𝑗 ∈ 𝐺𝑓𝑟






The retailer realizes disagreement payoff, 𝑑𝐺𝑓𝑟
𝑟 , if it does not carry manufacturer f’s group 
of products, 𝐺𝑓𝑟 , in its store, but contracts with others. Similarly, the manufacturer realizes a 
disagreement payoff, 𝑑𝐺𝑓𝑟
𝑓
, from the sales to other retailers in the case where the negotiation fails 
with retailer r for product group 𝐺𝑓𝑟 . Assuming that the retail prices are fixed during negotiation, 
then the disagreement payoffs are given by: 
 
where 𝐿 × ∆𝑠𝑘
−𝐺𝑓𝑟(𝑝) is the change in market demand of product k that occurs when product 
group 𝐺𝑓𝑟 is no longer sold on the market. Those quantities can be derived through the substitution 
patterns estimated in the demand model as follows: 
 
Optimizing equation (11) in the bargaining problem with respect to wholesale price, 𝑝𝑗
𝑤, 
leads to the first-order condition: 
  
𝑑𝐺𝑓𝑟
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Under the assumption that the retail prices for products are treated as fixed when wholesale prices 








𝑤 = 𝐿 ×  𝑠𝑗(𝑝) 









𝑟 ). Using equations (12), (13), (14) and (15), the following expression can be 
derived for the bargaining solution: 
 






















 ∑ [𝛤𝑗 ×  𝐿 ×  𝑠𝑗(𝑝)]
𝑗 ∈ 𝐺𝑓𝑟







  ( ∑  [𝛾𝑗 ×  𝐿 ×  𝑠𝑗(𝑝)] − ∑ [𝛾𝑘 × 𝐿 ×







   
                       (𝑇𝑓 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟) × 𝛤 =
1−𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟
𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟









where 𝛤 is 𝐽 × 1 vector of manufacturer’s margins; analogous to 𝑇𝑟 in the case of retailers, 𝑇𝑓 
characterizes manufacturers’ ownership structure of the products in the market; and 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟 is a 𝐽 × 𝐽 
matrix with the element 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟(𝑙, 𝑘) defined as follows: 









Adding equations (19) and (10) leads to the vector of the total margins for manufacturer-retailer 
pairs: 
 
𝑝 −𝑚𝑐𝑓 −𝑚𝑐𝑟 = Γ + 𝛾 =
1 − 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟
𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟
 (𝑇𝑓 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟)
−1
× (𝑇𝑟 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟) × 𝛾−(𝑇𝑟 ∗ Δ𝑟)




 [(𝑇𝑓 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟)
−1
× (𝑇𝑟 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟) × 𝛾] + 𝛾 (20)     
 
where 𝛾 = −(𝑇𝑟 ∗ 𝛥𝑟)
−1  ×  𝑠(𝑝)  is a 𝐽 × 1 vector of retail markups. 
Because we do not directly observe manufacturers’ marginal production costs, as well as 
retailers’ marginal distribution costs, we are not able to determine analytically the bargaining 
power 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟. We estimate the total marginal cost up to parameter vector 𝜑 by specifying the 
aggregate channel MC as follows: 
𝛤 =  
1 − 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟
𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟
 (𝑇𝑓 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟)
−1
(𝑇𝑟 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟) × 𝛾 
(19) 
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where 𝜔 is a vector of cost-shifting variables; 𝜑 is the vector of parameters associated with the 
cost-shifting variables; and  is the error term that accounts for the unobserved shocks to marginal 
cost.  
Using equation (20) and equation (21), the supply-side equation to be estimated is given 
by:   
 
where we can see from equation (22) that 𝐵𝐺𝑓𝑟 = [(𝑇𝑓 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟)
−1
(𝑇𝑟 ∗ 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟) × 𝛾], which is a 𝐽 × 1 
vector. Instead of using vector notation, equation (22) can be written at the product observation 
level as follows: 
 
Since our objective is to use equation (23) to estimate manufacturer-retailer pair-specific 
𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟, we interact variable 𝐵𝐺𝑓𝑟 with a full set of manufacturer-retailer pair zero-one dummy 
variables, i.e., we estimate:  
𝑀𝐶 = 𝜑𝜔 +  (21) 
  
𝑝 = 𝑀𝐶 + 
(1 − 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟)
𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟





𝑝𝑗 = 𝜑𝜔𝑗 +
1 − 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟
𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟








where fr indexes manufacturer-retailer pairs; (𝑛𝑓 × 𝑛𝑟) is the set product of manufacturer-retailer 
pairs; and 𝐼𝑓𝑟 is a zero-one dummy variable that is equal to one only for the group of products 
offered by manufacturer-retailer pair fr. We are then able to obtain an estimate of 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟 for each 
manufacturer-retailer pair.  
 There are two points about the econometric estimation of equation (24) worth mentioning 
here. First, note that the theory requires that each 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟 lie between zero and one. As such, our 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of equation (24) imposes this parameter 
restriction to be consistent with the theory. Second, as shown in describing equation (22), term 
𝐵𝐺𝑓𝑟 is a function of retail markups, 𝛾, and predicted product shares in 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟. As such, 𝐵𝐺𝑓𝑟 is likely 
correlated with unobserved shocks to marginal cost, 𝑗 , making 𝐵𝐺𝑓𝑟 in equation (24) endogenous. 
Therefore, consistent estimates of 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟 can only be obtained if appropriate instruments for 𝐵𝐺𝑓𝑟 
are used in estimation. 
 
1.4 Estimation and Identification  
1.4.1 Demand 
To estimate the set of demand parameters, we use generalized methods of moments 
(GMM) following the previous literature (Berry (1994); Berry, Levinson and Pakes (1995) (BLP); 
Nevo (2000a); and Petrin (2002)). The general strategy is to derive parameter estimates such that 
the observed product shares, 𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡, are equal to predicted product shares, 𝑠𝑗𝑚𝑡. 









Instruments for Demand Estimation 
To obtain consistent estimates of price coefficients,  𝛼𝑖, instrumental variables are required 
because when firms are setting their prices, they consider not only the product characteristics 
observed by us the researchers,  𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑡, but also the product characteristics,  𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡, that are not 
observed by us the researchers, but observed by all consumers. Firms also take into account any 
changes in the product characteristics and consumer valuations.5 To mitigate the endogeneity 
problem, we include product and market fixed effects. However, instruments for retail product 
prices are needed to deal with endogeneity problems that may remain even after controlling for 
product and market fixed effects. 
In constructing one set of retail product price instruments, we assume that input prices are 
uncorrelated with the unobserved econometric error, 𝜉𝑗𝑚𝑡, but highly correlated with retail price. 
The justification for this assumption is that consumers’ brand loyalty across yogurt products is 
most likely uncorrelated with the prices of inputs in the production of yogurt, e.g. prices of milk, 
sugar, strawberry, electricity etc., but these input prices do influence the retail price of yogurt 
(Villas-Boas (2007)). In addition, the intensity with which each input is used is likely to vary across 
yogurt brands. For example, some yogurt brands may use relatively more sugar than others; some 
brands may use more electricity for extra processing; only some brands use strawberry etc. As 
such, a change in price of a given input is likely to differentially influence production cost and 
therefore retail prices across yogurt brands. To allow input price to have differential production 
cost effects across brands of yogurt, we interact input prices with product dummies, and use these 
 
5 Villas-Boas (2007) 
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interaction variables as instruments for retail price. In fact, brands focusing on the production of 
different flavors are likely to use more sugar than plain yogurt brands. Therefore, the sugar usage 
intensity would be different between the yogurt brands. Thus, sugar prices interacted with the 
brand dummies are valid instruments for the endogenous retail price of yogurt. Data on the monthly 
price of sugar are obtained from the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  
Further, as shown by Berry and Haile (2014), the heterogeneity in consumer preferences 
for product characteristics creates an endogeneity problem that arises from the interaction of 
unknown demand parameters with market shares. The mean utilities that equate observed shares 
to predicted shares and the income terms will also be correlated with the unobserved error term. 
To mitigate this source of endogeneity, first, we define "count" variables of advertising 
characteristics for each product, i.e. number of times within the relevant month each product has 
been featured and specially displayed. This type of advertising information can be obtained from 
the data for each product to construct BLP type instruments. Then, we compute mean advertising 
counts across yogurt-type (Greek versus non-Greek type) products within each market, which 
facilitates computation of the deviation of each product’s advertising characteristic count from the 
relevant mean across similar yogurt-type products. We use deviation of each product’s advertising 
characteristic count as instruments in demand estimation. Deviation of each product’s advertising 
characteristic count from the relevant mean across similar yogurt-type products are likely to be 
correlated with products’ market shares because consumers’ preferences are likely to be influenced 
by differences in advertising intensities across products.  
To identify parameters governing consumer heterogeneity, we use the interaction of mean 
income with the input costs (price of sugar) and brand dummies as instruments.  
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1.4.2 Supply Equation  
On the supply side, we account for the endogeneity of the bargaining variable (𝐵𝐺𝑓𝑟  in 
equation (24)) in the estimation for the relative bargaining power parameters, 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟 . As previously 
discussed, 𝐵𝐺𝑓𝑟 is a function of retail markups, 𝛾, and predicted product shares in 𝑆𝐺𝑓𝑟 . As such, 
an appropriate instrument variable for 𝐵𝐺𝑓𝑟 should be correlated with either retail markups, 
predicted product shares, or both, but uncorrelated with unobserved shocks to marginal cost 
captured in 𝑗. 
 
Instruments for Supply Estimation 
To construct instruments for 𝐵𝐺𝑓𝑟 we make two key assumptions. First, we assume that a 
given change in consumer income will have differential effects across manufacturer-retailer pairs 
due to differential demand effects across the differing menu of products across manufacturer-
retailer pairs. Second, we assume that any variable that shifts marginal production cost will not 
have complete pass-through to retail prices due to the oligopoly structure of the industry. This 
assumption implies that any variable that shifts marginal production cost will also influence retail 
markups. As discussed above, a change in price of a given input is likely to differentially influence 
production cost across brands of products due to the differential intensities with which brands of 
products use the given input. Combined with incomplete cost-price pass-through, we therefore 
expect a change in price of a given input will in turn differentially influence retail markups across 
brands of products. Furthermore, the differential retail markup effects across brands of products 
will drive differential retail markup effects across manufacturer-retailer pairs due to differing menu 
of products across manufacturer-retailer pairs. 
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Since consumers’ income and the prices of inputs are unlikely to be correlated with 
unobserved shocks to the marginal cost of supplying yogurt, 𝑗, then the assumptions and 
discussion in the previous paragraph imply that three-way interactions of input price (e.g. price of 
sugar) with mean consumer income and manufacturer-retailer pair dummy variables are 
appropriate instruments for 𝐵𝐺𝑓𝑟. We use these three-way interaction variable instruments when 
estimating the bargaining power parameters, 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟, in the supply equation.    
  
1.5 Empirical Results 
1.5.1 Demand 
Standard Logit Model of Demand 
The first and second columns in Table 1.4 present the coefficient estimates from the linear 
regression of mean utility 𝛿𝑗 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑗𝑚𝑡) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆0𝑚𝑡) on various product and market 
characteristics, which is the standard logit specification of the demand model. Coefficient 
estimates of the standard logit specification of the demand model in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.4 
are obtained using ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
procedures, respectively. The estimates of price coefficients from OLS and 2SLS are negative and 
statistically significant. As mentioned before, price is an endogenous variable in demand 
estimation. Hence, OLS estimation in column 1 of Table 1.4 produces biased and inconsistent 
estimate of the price coefficient. To eliminate the endogeneity problem of price, we re-estimate 
the demand equation using 2SLS. The Wu-Hausman exogeneity test rejects the exogeneity of price 
at conventional levels of statistical significance, and suggests the instruments used are necessary. 
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Random Coefficients Logit Model of Demand 
Results from the random coefficients logit (RCM) specification of the demand model are 
presented in columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table 1.4. The coefficient estimate of price in the RCM 
model is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Column (4) reports parameters that capture consumer taste variation unobserved by the researchers 
for various product characteristics. The estimated effects are statistically and economically 
significant, suggesting that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their marginal disutility 
for price changes of yogurt products.  
Consumers tend to prefer yogurt products that are Greek style. This result is evident from 
the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate on the Greek dummy variable. 
Furthermore, the negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate on the interaction 
variable of Greek with consumer income suggests that lower income consumers have relatively 
stronger preferences for Greek style yogurt. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate on the Organic dummy 
variable suggests that organic yogurt products are associated with higher levels of utility compared 
to non-organic yogurt products, ceteris-paribus.  
 
Table 1.4 Demand estimation results for single-pack, 6-ounces yogurt products 
 
Variable 
Standard Logit  Random Coefficients  Logit 
      OLS       2SLS  GMM  







(𝛼, 𝛽) (𝛼, 𝛽)  (𝛼, 𝛽) (𝜎) (Income) 
Price -15.732*** -30.945***  -53.067*** -4.382*** 1.443*** 
 (0.213) (1.18) 
 (2.108) (1.138) (0.081) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎 0.568*** 0.971***  1.170*** 1.120***  
 (0.067) (0.073) 
 (0.073) (0.356)  
Greek 0.291*** 1.488***  3.135*** -1.293*** -0.126*** 
 (0.053) (0.105)  (0.312) (0.256) (0.011) 
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Organic 0.144*** 0.629***  1.196***   





   Label reads  
𝑆𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑎 -0.281*** -0.242***  -0.189***   
 (0.025) (0.0246) 
 (0.025)   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑎  0.072*** 0.071***  0.061***   
 (0.020) (0.0204) 
 (0.020)   
𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑎 -0.064*** -0.0734***  -0.076***   
 (0.005) (0.0048) 
 (0.005)   
𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎 0.178*** 0.181***  0.231***   
 (0.056) (0.0559) 




   Advertising   
Feature 0.117* -1.117***  -0.342*   
 (0.082) (0.129) 
 (0.176)   
Display 0.864*** 0.448***  0.764***   
 (0.177) (0.206) 
 (0.202)   
Fixed Effects       
County yes yes  yes   
Month yes yes  yes   





   
Exogeneity Test for 
IVs  
Wu-Hausman  264.792*** 
 




   
Other Statistics       
𝑅2 0.98      
GMM Objective    336.361   
# of Observations 15,224 15,224  15,224     
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a Estimates are calculated using the 
Minimum Distance approach described in Nevo (2000b). 
 
On average, consumers tend to dislike sugar-intensive and sodium-intensive yogurt brands 
as evidenced by the negative and statistically significant coefficient estimates on these two 
variables, Sugar and Sodium, respectively. This finding may in part reflect effective nutrition 
awareness campaigns of various groups and institutions. For example, Harvard Medical School 
suggests that sugar obtained from processed foods such as flavored yogurt, cereals, and cookies 
can lead to obesity, and have a serious impact on heart health.6 Based on research, there is an 
 
6 https://www.health.harvard.edu/heart-health/the-sweet-danger-of-sugar, accessed (December 19, 2019). 
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association between higher sugar diet and a greater risk of dying from heart disease (Yang et al., 
2014). According to the US Department of Health and Human Services, consuming low-sodium 
snacks can help to control daily sodium intake - which can help consumers to reduce the risk for 
high blood pressure and heart disease (Weinberger (1996)). 
The coefficient estimate on the variable Fat is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that whole-fat content yogurts are preferred by consumers, ceteris-paribus. There is 
evidence that full-fat dairy is correlated with a decreased risk of obesity: If something has a richer 
flavor, you may need less of it to feel satisfied. As such, consumers’ choice behavior with respect 
to yogurt consumption seems to be consistent with healthy nutrition recommendations.7 Recent 
study shows that whole-fat dairy consumption is associated with lower risk of mortality and major 
cardiovascular disease events (Dehghan et al., (2018)). 
Consumers are more likely to buy protein-intensive yogurt brands as evidenced by the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate on the Protein variable. Eating yogurt 
each day can help individuals to achieve their daily protein intake.8 If protein-intensive yogurt is 
chosen as a snack, research shows that there is a longer delay in requesting food; which helps to 
mitigate obesity (Khoury et al., (2014)). In line with these findings, our results show that protein-
intensive brands incentivize consumption of yogurt. 
 
 
7 https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/is-it-time-to-stop-skimming-over-full-fat-dairy-2019102118028, accessed 
(December 19, 2019). 
8 http://healthyeating.sfgate.com/much-protein-yogurt-6135.html, accessed (December 19, 2019). 
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1.5.2 Elasticities 
Given the structural demand estimates, we compute price elasticities of demand for each 
differentiated product.  
The average of own-price elasticities is -7.54. The estimated own-price elasticities are 
within the “ballpark” of estimates in previous studies on the yogurt industry. For example, 
Draganska and Jain (2006) estimated average own-price elasticities of -4.25, and Villas-Boas 
(2007) find average own-price elasticity estimates of -5.9. For consumption goods, Pinkse and 
Slade (2004) estimate average own-price elasticities equal to -2 for beer in the UK, Nevo (2000a) 
finds that own-price elasticities for ready-to-eat cereals are approximately -4 on average in the US, 
and Chintangunta et al. (2001) report own-price elasticities that range between -2 and -4. 
 
1.5.3 Supply Estimates 
Using demand estimates, we compute retail margins using equation (10), which are 
subsequently used when estimating parameters of the supply specification in equation (24). 
 
Supply Modeling Choice with Respect to the Production of Private Labels 
With the given scanner data for private label products, we do not have any information on 
the identity of manufacturer(s) of these products sold by retailers. As such, we need to make 
assumptions about the manufacturers of private label products, and estimate the supply-side model 
specification in equation (24) under each of the distinct assumptions. In particular, we estimate the 
supply-side model under each of the following two distinct assumptions:  
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Assumption 1: A single outside manufacturer produces all private label products carried by retailers 
in our data sample.  
Assumption 2: Each retailer that carries private label products contracts with a unique manufacturer 
to exclusively produce its private label products. 
 
Similar to the research methodology in Bonnet and Dubois (2010) and Celine and Boumra-
Mechmemache (2015), we use Vuong (1989) statistical non-nested test to assess which assumption 
on private label production best fits our data. The computed test statistic of the Vuong test is 22.47, 
which is greater than 1.64, implying that at the 5% level of statistical significance for this one-tale 
statistical test, Assumption 1 better fits the data compared to Assumption 2. Thus, we rely on the 
assumption that each retailer's private label is produced by a common outside manufacturer in the 
dataset. 
 To facilitate checking the robustness of our results, in Appendix A, we also report our 
estimation results under Assumption 2. 
 
Bargaining Power Parameter Estimates 
In Table 1.5, we provide manufacturer’s bargaining power parameter estimates produced 
by the supply-side model specification in equation (24) under Assumption 1. In the table, retailers 
are distinguished across columns, while manufacturers are distinguished across rows. The table 
reports on all manufacturers in the data sample, but due to space limitation, not all retailers are 
reported in the table.9 For a given manufacturer-retailer pair, the table reports the associated 
 
9 Upon request, we are happy to make available to the interested reader the full matrix of manufacturer-retailer pairs. 
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estimate of, (1 - 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟), that are strictly greater than zero. Many of the manufacturer’s bargaining 
power parameter estimates are statistically different from zero, and differ across manufacturer-
retailer pairs. Our estimates suggest that bargaining power is not an inherent characteristic of a 
retailer or a manufacturer, but varies depending on the identity of negotiating parties. 
On average, the manufacturer’s bargaining power, (1 - 𝜆𝐺𝑓𝑟), is a mean 0.6963, suggesting 
that, overall the balance of bargaining power between manufacturers and retailers in the United 
States yogurt industry disproportionately lies with the manufacturers. However, there exists 
substantial heterogeneity in relative bargaining power across manufacturer-retailer pairs. It is 
worth noting that bargaining power estimates for the manufacturer of private label products are a 
mean 0.2947, while manufacturers of national brands (all manufacturers except private label) have 
a mean bargaining power with retailers of 0.7101. Thus, as expected, national brand manufacturers 
have greater bargaining power with retailers compared to the manufacturer of private label 
products. These findings are consistent with the previous research suggesting that the introduction 
of store brands, i.e., private label products, increases retailers’ bargaining power (Chintagunta et 
al. (2002)). 
Among the manufacturers in our data sample, Turtle Mountain has the highest degree of 
bargaining power across retailers, with a mean level of bargaining power equal to 0.9538, followed 
by bargaining power levels of Redwood Farm Hill (mean of 0.9398) and Mehadrin Dairy Corp 
(mean of 0.9278), respectively. At the other extreme, Johanna Foods, Dean Foods, and Prairie 
Farms Dairy are manufacturers among the lowest-ranked with respect to bargaining power with 
retailers.  
It is natural to expect that manufacturers with larger share of industry sales are also likely 
to have greater bargaining power with retailers. However, our formal empirical results in Table 
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1.5 clearly reveal that this is not the case. The last two columns in the table report the 
manufacturers’ rank based on bargaining power and industry sales share, respectively. The data in 
these two columns reveal that the manufacturers who are ranked first, second, and third based on 
bargaining power are ranked ninth, sixteenth, and twenty- seventh respectively, based on the share 
of industry sales. In addition, manufacturers that are ranked as twenty-first, twenty-seventh, and 
twenty-second based on bargaining power are ranked as first, second, and third, respectively, based 
on the share of industry sales. A notable case in the table is Chobani, a manufacturer ranked first 
based on share of industry sales, but ranked twenty-first based on mean bargaining power across 








 Table 1.5 Manufacturer’s Bargaining Power Parameter Estimates, (1-𝜆), with each retailer 














































Turtle Mountain Inc.    0.9702      0.9749 0.9461 0.8908    0.9530 1 9 
     (0.2352)      (0.0243) (0.5138) (1.4127)          
Redwood Farm Hill 0.95042         0.9549      0.9398 2 16 
  (0.08951)         (0.0248)            
Mehadrin Dairy Corp        0.9277        0.9278 3 27 
         (0.5132)              
The Hain Celestial Group Inc. 0.9055   0.9568 0.8990  0.8528  0.9085 0.9085      0.9095 4 12 
  (0.5504)   (0.6399) (0.3231)  (2.8932)  (0.0491) (0.0603)            
Green Valley Organics     0.8883           0.8883 5 29 
      (0.2207)                 
Groupe Danone 0.9278 0.8936 0.8464 0.8924 0.8692 0.9214 0.9567 0.9220 0.8457 0.8917 0.8490 0.8450    0.8864 6 4 
  (0.69569) (0.16113) (0.7370) (3.1181) (0.2616) (0.1087) (0.6061) (1.3837) (0.2114) (0.2121) (5.4320) (5.7560)          
Emmi Roth USA Inc 0.934               0.8854 7 22 
  (0.2359)                     
Greece By Tyra S A   0.8786             0.8797 8 21 
    (0.4376)                   
Maple Hill Creamery          0.8824      0.8778 9 25 
           (0.2946)            
Kalona Organics         0.8762       0.8762 10 24 
          (0.5706)             
Fage  0.8412    0.8408  0.8901        0.8745 11 8 
   (0.6991)    (0.7028)  (1.3451)              
Liberty    0.8846 0.8753  0.9094   0.8623      0.8725 12 5 
     (1.7552) (0.0946)  (1.1594)   (0.1551)            
Wholesoy & Co 0.9096   0.8917    0.8551        0.8724 13 14 
  (0.5757)   (2.2248)    (2.5903)              
Wallaby . 0.8323   0.8662 0.8570           0.8608 14 10 




Table 1.5 Continues    
Springfield Creamery            0.8318    0.8318 15 30 
             (3.5152)          
Cascade Fresh    0.8449 0.0002  0.9322   0.8853      0.8288 16 15 
     (3.4913) (10.8067)  (1.0863)   (0.0995)            
Alpina   0.7812 0.6896   0.8528    0.7857 0.8036    0.7952 17 18 
    (0.6373) (15.2373)   (2.8682)    (5.9352) (5.4282)          
Green Mountain Creamery 0.7571               0.7557 18 23 
  (3.9510)                     
Whitewave Foods Company     0.7862 0.8307    0.6911 0.8054 0.8053    0.7526 19 7 
      (0.3996) (0.2763)    (0.7049) (5.3903) (5.3959)          
Schreiber Foods Inc           0.7373 0.7449    0.7454 20 26 
            (10.8823) (10.7586)          
Chobani 0.6715 0.7388 0.7894 0.8607 0.7633 0.7620 0.7792 0.7761 0.7886 0.0014 0.7834 0.7856 0.8432 0.8505 0.6662 21 1 
  (1.1033) (2.9676) (4.2478) (2.2600) (4.8235) (2.9450) (4.7052) (3.1402) (3.0524) (38.2292) (12.7896) (12.4954) (3.3255) (3.3638)       
General Mills 0.6616 0.6203 0.7075 0.5143 0.0005 0.6606 0.5504 0.7057 0.7499 0.4807 0.6153 0.6120    0.6336 22 3 
  (6.1492) (0.9490) (3.4898) (40.8564) (9.7893) (0.7868) (29.2684) (9.0571) (3.620)0 (4.0238) (26.2846) (26.5827)          
Tula Foods     0.5966           0.5966 23 11 
      (3.2423)                 
H P Hood Inc              0.2912 0.46113 24 20 
               (34.0372)       
National Dairy Holdings 0.7336  0.4565  0.5200      0.4591 0.2866    0.3964 25 28 
  (3.1050)  (7.8133)  (1.1462)      (42.5767) (74.0695)          
Tillamook Creamery        0.3166         0.3166 26 13 
        65.6816               
Private Label 0.2078 0.0018  0.1250 0.0008 0.0006 0.0091 0.502  0.6837      0.2947 27 2 
  (40.5333) (28.0132)  (212.8623) (19.7367) (26.4724) (198.006) (45.386)  (1.7170)            
Johanna Foods  0.0027   0.7180 0.0003          0.2727 28 6 
   (5.7240)   (0.3648) (6.4750)                
Dean Foods             0.0296   0.0361 29 17 
              (58.907)         
Praire Farms Dairy    0.00009            0.0005 30 19 
        (143.1130)                           
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses.    
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The Influence of Product Line Width and Depth on Manufacturer’s Bargaining Power 
To gain more insight into the impact of preexisting product line width and product line 
depth on the bargaining power of manufacturers with retailers, we first estimate the following 
regression: 
 





𝑟=1 + 𝜖𝑓𝑟   (25) 
 
where 𝐼𝑓 represents a zero-one dummy variable that equals to 1 only for bargaining power 
measures (1 − 𝜆𝑓𝑟) that belong to manufacturer f with other retailers; 𝜏𝑓 is a fixed effect parameter 
for manufacturer f that captures manufacturer-specific attributes that are observed as well as 
unobserved by us the researchers, which influence the manufacturer’s bargaining power with 
retailers; 𝑛𝑓  is the number of manufacturers in our data sample; 𝐼𝑟 represents a zero-one dummy 
variable that equals to 1 only for bargaining power measures (1 − 𝜆𝑓𝑟) associated with retailer r; 
𝜏𝑟 is a fixed effect parameter for retailer r that captures retailer-specific attributes that are observed 
as well as unobserved by us the researchers; 𝑛𝑟  is the number of retailers in our data sample; and 
𝜖𝑓𝑟 is a mean-zero stochastic error term. Using fixed effects, note that equation (25) controls for 
both observed as well as unobserved manufacturer-specific and retailer-specific attributes that may 
influence the bargaining power of manufacturers with retailers.    
Once estimates of 𝜏𝑓 are obtained from equation (25), we then estimate the following 
regression: 
 
𝜏𝑓 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑓 + 𝜌2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑊𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ𝑓 + 𝑓  (26) 
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where 𝑓 is a mean-zero stochastic error term capturing other manufacturer-specific determinants 
of the manufacturer’s bargaining power with retailers. The advantage of the empirical approach 
captured by equation (25) and equation (26) above is that we explicitly recognize and account for 
determinants of manufacturers’ bargaining power that are unrelated to product line depth and 
product line width. Since we do not have information to enable computing measures of product 
line width and product line depth for store brand manufacturers, we exclude private label 
manufacturer(s) from the linear regressions in equation (25) and equation (26). 
Table 1.6 presents the estimation results where there are two specifications of equation (26) 
distinguished only by the measure of preexisting product line depth used. Model 1 uses the 
measure Product Line Depth – Maximum, which as previously described is a variable measuring 
the number of flavors offered within the given manufacturer’s largest product line. However, 
Model 2 uses the measure Product Line Depth – Average, which as previously described is a 
variable measuring the average number of flavors offered across the given manufacturer’s product 
lines. The coefficient estimates in Table 1.6 suggest that a manufacturer’s preexisting range of 
horizontally differentiated products, product line depth, driven by its strategy to extend the depth 
of existing product lines, has no statistically discernable impact on its bargaining power with 
retailers. Similarly, a manufacturer’s preexisting number of distinct brands, i.e., product line width, 
has no statistically discernable impact on the manufacturer’s bargaining power with retailers. In 
other words, the empirical evidence suggests that neither greater depth in a manufacturer’s existing 
product lines, nor number of unique product lines have an influence on its bargaining power with 
retailers. Our results are robust under both assumptions regarding manufacturer(s) of private label 
products. Table A2 in Appendix A shows the impact of the manufacturer’s characteristics on its 
bargaining power under Assumption 2: A unique outside manufacturer produces each private label. 
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These results raise the following question: If expanding product line depth and product 
line width have no influence on manufacturers’ bargaining power with retailers, then why do so 
many manufacturers actively pursue product proliferation strategies? The subsequent analysis and 
discussion shed some light on answering this question. 
 
Why do so many manufacturers actively pursue product proliferation strategies? 
Why do manufacturers continue to introduce similar products under existing product lines? 
Is it because expanding product lines horizontally serves to increase the size of the profit pie that 
is shared with retailers? Is there also evidence that by offering broader product lines, manufacturers 
have the advantage to meet the needs and wants of heterogeneous consumers; and thus increase 
consumer demand for the manufacturer’s menu of products? Our empirical analysis now provides 
some evidence with respect to answering these questions. 
Previous theoretical research (e.g. Lancaster (1990) and Ratchford (1990)) examined the 
reasons for firms’ decision to product proliferate, and posit the following: 
• A broader product line can increase the overall demand faced by the firm. 
• Instead of focusing on one product, a broader product line may yield cost 
advantages for the firm owing to economies of scope. 











 (1) (2)  
Model 1 Model 2 
   




Product Line Depth (Average)  -0.0142 
  (0.0178) 
Product Line Width -0.0163 -0.0333 
 (0.0334) (0.0273) 
Constant 1.100*** 1.125*** 
 (0.0993) (0.129) 
   
Observations 29 29 
R-squared 0.090 0.081 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As mentioned in Connor (1981); manufacturers are choosing to apply product proliferation 
because they believe that new products are essential for firm growth and for financial success. In 
addition, Connor (1981) argues that manufacturers believe that product proliferation can broaden 
consumers’ choice, and through market segmentation, better meets consumer demand. Developing 
horizontally differentiated products may also work as an effective defense strategy to maintain the 
market share for the manufacturer’s leading products. For example, manufacturers offering unique 
flavors, or other unique attributes under a given brand might generate an increase in that brand's 
reputation among consumers (Berger et al. (2007)). 
With the arguments from the theoretical research in hand, we use our measurements for 
manufacturers’ product line depth and product line width to assess their impact on the 
manufacturer’s variable profit, quantity sold (demand), and price-cost margins. For this part of the 
analysis we run the following regressions: 
 





𝑟=1 + 𝜔𝑓𝑟    (27) 
 
where for economy of presentation, we define 𝑍 𝑓𝑟 to represent either variable profit, quantity sold 
(demand), or mean price-cost margin of each manufacturer; while the variables and parameters on 
the right-hand-side of equation (27) are defined similar to those in equation (25).  In particular, 𝜓𝑓 
is a fixed effect parameter for manufacturer f  that captures manufacturer-specific attributes that 
are observed as well as unobserved by us the researchers, which influence either the 
manufacturer’s variable profit, quantity sold (demand), or mean price-cost margin, depending on 
which of these three measures 𝑍 𝑓𝑟 represents in equation (27). Once estimates of 𝜓𝑓 are obtained 
from equation (27), we then estimate the following regression: 
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𝜓𝑓 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑓 + 𝜅2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑊𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ𝑓 + 𝜍𝑓 (28) 
 
Table 1.7 report results from estimating equation (28) in cases where 𝑍 𝑓𝑟 represent either 
variable profit, quantity sold (demand), or mean price-cost margin of each manufacturer in the 
previously estimated equation (27). Results for the impact of manufacturers’ product line depth 
and product line width on their variable profits are reported in columns (1) and (2) of the table. 
The results indicate that expanding product line depth increases the variable profit of 
manufacturers. However, increasing the number of distinct product lines does not have a 
statistically significant impact on the manufacturer’s variable profit. In summary, even though 
expanding product line depth seems to have no impact on the bargaining power of a manufacturer 
with retailers, we find evidence that such an expansion increases the manufacturer’s variable profit, 
no doubt owing to an expansion in the size of the full variable profit pie shared with retailers. As 
such, consistent with the theoretical literature (Lancaster (1979); Connor (1981); Quelch and 
Kenny (1994)), the evidence suggests that it is profit-maximizing for manufacturers to product 
proliferate.   
Results reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.7 show that a manufacturer’s product 
line depth has a positive impact on the unit sales of its products. However, a manufacturer’s 
product line width does not have a statistically significant effect on unit sales of its products. Again 
consistent with the theoretical literature (Lancaster (1979); Connor (1981); Quelch and Kenny 
(1994)), our empirical results suggest that offering deeper product lines with similar qualities 
(horizontal product differentiation) can allow better matching of products with consumers’ 
heterogonous tastes, yielding higher demand for the given manufacturer’s products.  
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 Table 1.7 Variable profit, Quantity sold and Price-cost Margins as a function of manufacturer’s characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




       
Product line depth (maximum) 43.98  1,837  0.0300**  
 (36.07)  (1,318)  (0.0117)  
Product line depth (average)  87.86*  3,487*  0.0468*** 
  (50.61)  (1,847)  (0.0164) 
Product line width  26.96 85.94 1,457 3,945 0.0184 0.0602** 
 (97.95) (77.56) (3,578) (2,830) (0.0317) (0.0252) 
Constant -2,003*** -2,291*** -79,412*** -90,434*** -0.865*** -0.989*** 
 (290.9) (365.9) (10,629) (13,352) (0.0940) (0.119) 
       
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.103 0.150 0.140 0.187 0.337 0.366 






Last, results reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.7 show that both manufacturer’s 
product line depth and product line width has a positive and statistically significant impact on the 
manufacturer’s mean price-cost margin charged across its menu of products. The results suggest 
that our finding of a positive impact of a manufacturer’s product line depth on its variable profit is 
driven by the product line depth’s influence on both unit sales and price-cost margins. Our results 
are robust under both assumptions regarding the manufacturer(s) of private label products. Table 
A3 in Appendix A shows the impact of the manufacturer’s characteristics on its variable profit, 
quantity sold, and price-cost margins under Assumption 2: A unique outside manufacturer 
produces each private label. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we empirically investigate how a manufacturer’s offering of different branded 
product lines, and number of flavors under a given line, separately influences the manufacturer's 
bargaining power with retailers in the U.S. yogurt industry. To answer this question, we first 
estimated a structural econometric model to recover parameter estimates of relative bargaining 
power for a sample of manufacturer-retailer pairs. We then use a sequence of linear regression 
models to study how the estimates of manufacturers’ bargaining power with retailers relate to the 
manufacturers’ preexisting number of unique product lines, i.e., their product line width, as well 
as the number of horizontally differentiated products within these product lines, i.e., their product 
line depth. Our study contributes to the literature on determinants of bargaining power within the 
manufacturer-retailer vertical channel (Draganska et al. (2010); Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012); 
Doudchenko and Yurukoglu (2016); Bonnet and Bouamra-Mechemache (2015); Bonnet et al. 
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(2015); Grennan (2013); Grennan (2014); Haucap et al. (2013); Ellickson et al. (2018)), and 
provides new, and surprising, empirical evidence on a couple determinants. 
We find that a manufacturer’s range of preexisting horizontally differentiated products, 
product line depth, driven by its strategy to extend the depth of existing product lines, and a 
manufacturer’s preexisting number of distinct brands, i.e. product line width, surprisingly, have 
no statistically discernable impact on the bargaining power of the manufacturers with 
retailers. These findings raise the following question: If expanding product line depth and product 
line width have no influence on manufacturers’ bargaining power with retailers, then why do so 
many manufacturers actively pursue product proliferation strategies? 
Even though expanding product line depth and product line width seems to have no impact 
on the bargaining power of a manufacturer with retailers, i.e., does not influence the 
manufacturer’s share of the profit pie with retailers, consistent with the theoretical literature 
(Lancaster (1979); Connor (1981); Quelch and Kenny (1994)), we find evidence that such an 
expansion increases the manufacturer’s variable profit, no doubt owing to an expansion in the size 
of the full variable profit pie shared with retailers. As such, the evidence suggests that it is profit-
maximizing for manufacturers to product proliferate. Also consistent with the theoretical literature, 
we find evidence suggesting that a manufacturer’s product line depth has a positive impact on its 
unit sales across its menu of products. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the positive impact 
of a manufacturer’s product line depth on its variable profit is driven by the product line depth’s 
influence on both unit sales and price-cost margins charged.  
Our analysis provides other interesting results. First, we find that the balance of bargaining 
power between manufacturers and retailers in the United States yogurt industry disproportionately 
lies with the manufacturers. However, there exists substantial heterogeneity in relative bargaining 
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power across manufacturer-retailer pairs. Second, while it is natural to expect that manufacturers 
with larger share of industry sales are also likely to have greater bargaining power with retailers, 
our empirical results clearly reveal that this is not the case. From a policy perspective, an 
implication of this finding is that competition authorities will need to sharpen their focus case-by-
case when assessing bargaining power, and not be unduly influenced by the relative size of the 
manufacturer in the industry. Last, as expected, the evidence suggests that national brand 
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Chapter 2 - Introduction of Greek Yogurt and Its Market Impacts on 
U.S. Yogurt Industry 
2.1 Introduction 
New product introductions that extend the firm’s product line have become a popular 
competition strategy. Yogurt is produced and consumed worldwide, and its popularity has 
increased in recent years. In the U.S., the per capita consumption of yogurt has risen from 3.6 
pounds per person in the year 1984 to 14.9 pounds per person in the year 2014, a 313 percent 
increase. 10  
Greek yogurt is differentiated from regular yogurt during the straining process: It is 1.5 
more time strained than regular yogurt on average, resulting in the removal of most liquid whey. 
Thus, compared to regular yogurt, Greek yogurt has more protein, fewer carbohydrates, and is 
thicker and stronger in flavor- making it more a healthy snack. In response to pro-health changes 
in tastes and preferences of consumers, producers have started supplying healthier food products. 
The dynamism of yogurt market, new flavors, packaging, production technologies, also kept 
consumers interested in this category, have helped broaden yogurt’s appeal as a breakfast item, 
snack, dessert or a meal replacement. 
With the entrance of Chobani in 2007, the popularity of Greek yogurt has risen widely in 
the United States.  Although there has been an extensive amount of research regarding the impacts 
of the introduction of a new product/or brand in different types of industries, there has been no 
previous empirical research regarding the market impacts of the introduction and rise in popularity 
 
10 https://aei.ag/2020/02/23/u-s-dairy-consumption-trends-in-9-charts/, accessed (May 3, 2020). 
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of Greek yogurt. As such, a key objective of our study is to empirically analyze the market impacts 
that Greek yogurt has had on other types of yogurts.  
To achieve our objectives, we first estimate the differentiated- products consumer demand 
using a discrete choice model. The estimated demand parameters and the assumption about the 
strategic behavior of competing firms in the industry are used to recover price elasticities and 
marginal cost. Similar in spirit to Petrin’s (2002) work, we use the estimated model to perform 
counterfactual experiments designed to assess the market impact of Greek yogurt on other types 
of yogurt.  
Our empirical model suggests that consumers tend to prefer Greek-type yogurts more 
compared to Non-Greek-type yogurts. In addition, consumers' socioeconomic status plays an 
important role in their yogurt consumption: Lower-income households consume more Greek-style 
yogurt than their high-income households. We find that, on average, consumers are responsive to 
changes in the price of yogurt products. In particular, consumers are more price-sensitive when 
consuming Greek-type yogurts.  
The counterfactual analysis result shows that Greek-type products result in lower prices of 
Non-Greek-type products by a mean 39.85%. In addition, the introduction of Greek-type yogurt 
results in higher quantity demand for Non-Greek type yogurt products by a mean 45.22%. These 
findings are showing that the presence of Greek-type yogurt indeed increases the consumption of 
Non-Greek type yogurt products due to lower prices.  In addition, the introduction of Greek yogurt 
decreases the fraction of consumers choosing not to purchase yogurt products by a mean 1.12%, 
which shows that the presence of Greek-type yogurt products has an expansionary market effect 
in the U.S. yogurt market.  
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A number of economic and marketing studies examined the yogurt industry. Most studies 
are applied to the U.S. yogurt market, based on consumer-level data and limited to some brands to 
answer questions regarding consumer demand and supply side (Villas-Boas and Winer (1999); 
Anderson and De Palma (2001); Chintagunta et al. (2001); Ackerbeg (2001)). Later, studies 
analyzing the yogurt industry adopt market level data to analyze consumer’s multiple purchases to 
measure satiation of different offerings (Kim et al. (2002); Villas-Boas (2007); Giacomo (2008)). 
There are also studies using the yogurt industry to analyze product entry and exit (Rosetti (2018)). 
Given recent changes in the U.S. yogurt industry, our study focuses on a better understanding of 
the introduction and the rise in Greek yogurt’s popularity on other types of yogurts in the market. 
Our paper also contributes to the existing set of empirical evidence on product introduction on 
market power in dynamic markets.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the data; 
Section 3 outlines the econometric model of the yogurt market; Section 4 explains the estimation 
and identification strategies; Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 provides the main 
conclusions of the paper. 
2.2 Data 
This study primarily uses data made available by the U.S. marketing firm, Information 
Resources Inc. (IRI). IRI collected data by using scanning devices from a sample of stores 
belonging to different retail chains located in various areas of the U.S. The data consist of weekly 
prices and the total sales of almost all brands of yogurt sold in the U.S. We use data from year 
2008 to 2012.11  
 
11 Data are available from 2001 to 2012.  
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We chose to delineate the geographic market areas by county, which is often a smaller 
geographic area compared to IRI designated geographic market areas. In our study, each market is 
defined as the unique combination of county, month, and year. Each product in the dataset is 
defined as a unique combination of non-price characteristics, such as yogurt style (Greek vs. non-
Greek), brands, flavor/scent, organic information, and packaging type. We aggregate weekly data 
up to monthly sales and dollar value revenue from sales for each product in each market. The 
average retail product prices are computed by dividing monthly sales revenue by monthly unit 
sales.  
We use a discrete choice demand model similar to Villas-Boas (2007), which requires 
computing product shares, as well as the share of an outside option in each market. First, we 
describe how potential market size is measured in this study, which is used in computing product 
shares and the share of the outside option in each market. Following Villas-Boas (2007), we 
assumed that per capita yogurt consumption for each individual in the U.S. is half of the per capita 
yogurt consumption per month. After obtaining the population of each county from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS), we multiplied the number of the adult population with half of the per capita 
yogurt consumption, which yields the measure we use for potential market size for each defined 
market, respectively. The observed share associated with each product in a given market is 
computed by dividing the product’s unit sales by the market’s potential size measure. The observed 
share of the outside option is computed as one minus the sum of observed shares across products 
within a given market. Table 2.1 lists and defines the variables used in the analysis. 
 
 Table 2.1 Description of available variables 
 
Name Description 
Price Average monthly price in dollar per ounce. 
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Market Share (𝑆𝑗) Monthly market share for each product are computed as the total 
   quantity sold divided by the potential market size. 
Feature count Counts feature(s) (i.e., frequent shopper program, large size advertisement) 
  occurred for product during that month. 
Display count Counts the special display(s) (e.g. end aisle, lobby) occurred for each  
  product during that month. 
Sugar Sugar price per ounce. 
Milk Milk price per ounce. 
Yogurt Style Dummy=1 if the product is Greek yogurt, zero otherwise. 
 
 
For the empirical analysis, we need to supplement the IRI dataset with data on non-price 
product characteristics and consumer demographics. Assuming an individual's income and the 
number of kids in a household are presumably relevant to his/her demand for yogurt, we have 
drawn income and the number of children information of consumers from the U.S. Census 
Integrated Public Microdataset Sample (IPUMS). Our model considers the interactions of 
consumer demographics with the price and selected non-price product characteristics, such as 
yogurt style, i.e., Greek versus non-Greek style. 
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics for single-pack, 6-ounces yogurt products over the 
years 2008 to 2012. The average price of yogurt per ounce is $0.145. Data on cost shifting 
variables, price of milk12 and sugar13, obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) database. The cost-shifting variable relates more closely to manufacturers’ cost.  
 
12 https://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/graphics/data/pricemk.txt, accessed (February 23, 2020). 




2.3 Econometric Model of the Yogurt Market 
We model the market for yogurt using a structural model of demand and strategic behavior 
of retailers and manufacturers. The empirical strategy is as follows. First, we estimate consumers’ 
preferences in the yogurt market. Consumers in a market face a choice set that includes the offers 
of different yogurt products, and each product is defined as a combination of non-price 
characteristics. Using demand parameter estimates, along with an assumed static Nash equilibrium 
price-setting behavior of firms, we recover product level price-cost margins. In the final step of 
the empirical methodology, we perform a counterfactual experiment in which we artificially 
remove Greek-type yogurt products from the consumers’ choice set and measure the model 
predicted price changes in Non-Greek yogurt products and consumers’ Non-Greek type yogurt 
consumption. 
 
2.3.1 Demand Model 
We use a random coefficients logit model to estimate the demand and related price 
elasticities (Berry and Pakes (2001)). Suppose there are M markets, m=1,. . .,M and in each market, 
 Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of single-pack, 6-ounces yogurt products 
Description Mean S.E. Min Max 
Average price ($/ounce) 0.145 0.0005 0.05 0.55 
Aggregate sales (ounces) 1430.75 17.93 6 274176 
Sugar prices (cents/ounce) 63.3752 0.019 67.9 69.6 
Milk prices (cents/ounce) 3.4687 0.0003 2.979 3.961 
Feature 0.6962 0.0005 0 8 
Display 0.0431 0.0007 0 8 
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there are 𝐿𝑚  potential consumers. A typical consumer i can choose to either buy one of the J 
differentiated products, j=1,. . .,J or otherwise choose the outside good 0 (j=0), allowing for the 
possibility of consumer i not buying one of the J marketed goods. Therefore, consumer i chooses 
between  J+1 alternatives in market m. Consumer i’s conditional indirect utility for the outside 
good is 𝑢𝑖0 = 𝑖0𝑚, while for products j=1,. . .,J  it is: 
where in equation (1), 𝑥𝑗𝑚 is a vector of observed non-price product characteristics. The parameter 
vector 𝛽𝑖 contains consumer-specific valuations for the product characteristics. Parameter 𝛼𝑖  
captures consumer-specific disutility of price. 𝑝𝑗𝑚 is the price of yogurt per ounce; 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑚 
captures county-specific fixed effects; 𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ captures month fixed effects; 𝜏𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 captures year 
fixed effects; 𝑦𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝜏𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 is the interaction between zero-one dummy variable 
yogurt_style  that takes a value of one when the relevant product is classified as “Greek yogurt” 
and year, with associated parameter vector 𝜌; 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑗 captures product-specific fixed effects; 
and 𝜉𝑗𝑚 is the unobserved (by the econometrician) brand characteristics (i.e., quality, reputation, 
etc.) that have an impact on consumer utility, whereas 𝑖𝑗𝑚 is a mean-zero stochastic error term. 




𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑚 = 𝑥𝑗𝑚𝛽𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑚 + 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑚 + 𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝜏𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜌(𝑦𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝜏𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)










) + 𝜙𝐷𝑖 + 𝛴𝜗𝑖 
 
  (2) 
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In Equation (2), 𝛼 and 𝛽 parameters are the mean marginal utilities of respective observable 
product characteristics. 𝐷𝑖 is an m-dimensional column vector of demographic variables, while 𝜗𝑖  
is a k-dimensional column vector that captures unobserved consumer characteristics. 𝜙 is a 𝑘 × 𝑚 
matrix of parameters that measure how taste characteristics vary with demographics, and 𝛴 is a 
𝑘 × 𝑘 diagonal matrix with the standard deviations, 𝜎𝑘, on the diagonal that measures the variation 
in tastes due to random shocks. In our estimation, we consider income and the number of children 
residing within a household as demographic variables, and we expressed the demographic 
variables in deviation from their respective mean. Thus, the mean of 𝐷𝑖 is zero. Following Nevo 
(2000b), we assume that 𝜗𝑖 has a standard multivariate normal distribution, 𝜗𝑖~N(0,1). The 
assumptions regarding 𝐷𝑖 and 𝜗𝑖 along with equation (2) imply that, the mean of 𝛼𝑖 is 𝛼, and the 
mean of 𝛽𝑖 is  𝛽, while variances of these consumer-specific marginal utilities are equal to the 
square of the elements on the main diagonal of 𝛴. 
We can break down the indirect utility into a mean utility, 𝛿𝑗𝑚 =  𝑥𝑗𝑚𝛽 + 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑚 +
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑚 + 𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝜏𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜌(𝑦𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝜏𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑗 + ξ𝑗𝑚, and a deviation 
from this mean utility 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑚(𝑥𝑗𝑚, 𝑝𝑗𝑚, 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜗𝑖; 𝜙, Σ ) = [𝑝𝑗𝑚, 𝑥𝑗𝑚](𝜙𝐷𝑖 + Σ𝜗𝑖). As such, the indirect 
utility can be re-written as: 
For computational tractability, the idiosyncratic error term 𝑖𝑗𝑚 is assumed to be governed 
by an independent and identically distributed extreme value density. Individual i’s probability of 
buying product j in market m is as follows: 
  





The market share of product j in market m is given by: 
where d𝐹(𝐷)̂ and 𝑑𝐹(𝑣) are population distribution functions for consumer demographics and 
random taste shocks assumed to be independently distributed. For the integral in Equation (5), 
there is no closed-form solution. Thus, it must be approximated numerically by using random 
draws from 𝐹(𝐷)̂ and 𝐹(𝑣). 
Finally, the demand for product j is given by: 
where in equation (6), 𝐿𝑚 is  a measure of market size in a given county; 𝑠𝑗𝑚𝑡(𝑥, 𝑝, 𝜉; 𝑑) is the 
model predicted share of product j;  𝑥, 𝑝, and 𝜉 are vectors of observed non-price characteristics, 
price and the unobserved vector of product characteristics, respectively; and 𝑑=( 𝛼, 𝛽, 
𝜌, 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑚, 𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ , 𝜏𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟, 𝜌(𝑦𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝜏𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟), 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑗, 𝜙, 𝛴) is a vector of demand 
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2.3.2 Supply Side 
Suppose there are 𝑓 = 1,2, … , 𝐹 firms. Assuming that firms simultaneously choose prices 
as in static Bertrand-Nash model, where each firm 𝑓 offers a subset of differentiated, 𝐹𝑓, of the 𝐽 
products.  Thus, in each market, the firm f’s variable profit is given by 
 
in equilibrium the quantity of yogurt product j that gets sold in market m, 𝑞𝑗𝑚, is exactly equal to 
the market of this product, i.e. 𝑞𝑗𝑚= 𝐿𝑚 × 𝑠𝑗𝑚 (p). Recall that 𝐿𝑚 is a measure of potential market 
size; 𝑠𝑗𝑚(𝒑) is the predicted market share function for product j; and p is a vector of the prices for 
the J products in market m; 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚 is the marginal cost of product j in market m.  
The price of product j produced by firm f must satisfy the first- order condition:  
Market subscripts are suppressed in equation (8) and many subsequent equations to avoid 
a clutter of notation. The system of equations in equation (8) can be expressed in matrix form as 
follows: 
  



















where 𝒔(𝒑), 𝒑, and 𝒎𝒄 are 𝐽 × 1 vectors of market share, prices and marginal costs respectively, 
whereas Ω ∗ Δ is an element- by- element multiplication of two matrices. 
 Ω is a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix that describes firms’ ownership structure of the 𝐽 products. Let Ω𝑗𝑟 
denote an element in Ω, where 
 
Ω 𝑗𝑟 = {
1
0




In other words, Ω 𝑗𝑟=1 if products j and r are produced by the same firm, otherwise Ω 𝑗𝑟 = 0.  Δ is 
a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix of first- order partial derivatives of product market shares with respect to prices, 




 Using equation (9), product level markup estimates can be show as follows:  
Equation (10) above implies that product level markup estimates depends on exclusively 
on demand side parameter estimates. Using the computed product- level markups and product 
prices, product-level marginal cost can be recovered as follows:   
 
  










2.4 Estimation and Identification 
To estimate the set of demand parameters, we use generalized methods of moments 
(GMM) following the previous literature [Berry (1994); Berry, Levinson and Pakes (1995) (BLP); 
Nevo (2000a); and Petrin (2002)]. The general strategy is to derive parameter estimates such that 
the observed product shares 𝑆𝑗𝑚 are equal to predicted product shares 𝑠𝑗𝑚. 
 
Instruments 
To obtain consistent estimates of price coefficients,  𝛼𝑖, instrumental variables are required 
because when firms are setting their prices, they consider not only the product characteristics 
observed by us the researchers,  𝑥𝑗𝑚, but also the product characteristics,  𝜉𝑗𝑚, that are not observed 
by us the researchers, but observed by all consumers. Firms also take into account any changes in 
the product characteristics and consumer valuations.14 To mitigate the endogeneity problem, we 
include product and market fixed effects. However, instruments for retail product prices are needed 
to deal with endogeneity problems that may remain even after controlling for product and market 
fixed effects. 
In constructing one set of retail product price instruments, we assume that input prices are 
uncorrelated with the unobserved econometric error, 𝜉𝑗𝑚, but highly correlated with retail price. 
The justification for this assumption is that consumers’ brand loyalty across yogurt products is 
most likely uncorrelated with the prices of inputs in the production of yogurt, e.g. prices of milk, 
sugar, strawberry, electricity etc., but these input prices do influence the retail price of yogurt 
 
14 Villas-Boas (2007). 
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[Villas-Boas (2007)]. In addition, the intensity with which each input is used is likely to vary across 
yogurt brands. For example, some yogurt brands may use relatively more sugar than others; some 
brands may use more electricity for extra processing; only some brands use strawberry etc. As 
such, a change in price of a given input is likely to differentially influence production cost and 
therefore retail prices across yogurt brands. To allow input price to have differential production 
cost effects across brands of yogurt, we interact input prices with product dummies, and use these 
interaction variables as instruments for retail price. In fact, the brand “Chobani” focuses on high 
protein Greek-style yogurt, which is likely to consume more milk in processing and less sugar than 
regular yogurt. Therefore, the milk and sugar consumption would be different between the Greek 
yogurt brands such as “Chobani” and the regular yogurt brands “Yoplait”. Thus, the monthly milk 
and sugar prices interacted with the brand dummies are instruments for the endogenous retail price 
of yogurt. The monthly price of milk and sugar information is obtained from the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture. 
Further, as shown by Berry and Haile (2014), the heterogeneity in consumer preferences 
for product characteristics creates an endogeneity problem that arises from the interaction of 
unknown demand parameters with market shares. The mean utilities that equate observed shares 
to predicted shares and the income terms will also be correlated with the unobserved error term. 
To mitigate this source of endogeneity, first, we define "count" variables of advertising 
characteristics for each product, i.e. number of times within the relevant month each product has 
been featured and specially displayed. This type of advertising information can be obtained from 
the data for each product to construct BLP type instruments. Then, we compute mean advertising 
counts across yogurt-type (Greek versus non-Greek type) products within each market, which 
facilitates computation of the deviation of each product’s advertising characteristic count from the 
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relevant mean across similar yogurt-type products. We use deviation of each product’s advertising 
characteristic count as instruments in demand estimation. Deviation of each product’s advertising 
characteristic count from the relevant mean across similar yogurt-type products are likely to be 
correlated with products’ market shares because consumers’ preferences are likely to be influenced 
by differences in advertising intensities across products.  
To identify parameters governing consumer heterogeneity, we use the interaction of mean 
income with the input costs (price of sugar and milk) and brand dummies as instruments.  
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Demand 
Standard Logit Model of Demand 
The first and second columns in Table 2.3 present the coefficient estimates from the linear 
regression of mean utility 𝛿𝑗 = log(𝑆𝑗𝑚) − log(𝑆0𝑗𝑚) on various product and market 
characteristics, which is the standard logit specification of the demand model. Coefficient 
estimates of the standard logit specification of the demand model in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.3 
are obtained using ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
procedures, respectively. The estimates of price coefficients from OLS and 2SLS are negative and 
statistically significant. As mentioned before, price is an endogenous variable in demand 
estimation. Hence, OLS estimation in column 1 of Table 2.3 produces biased and inconsistent 
estimate of the price coefficient. To eliminate the endogeneity problem of price, we re-estimate 
the demand equation using 2SLS. The Wu-Hausman exogeneity test rejects the exogeneity of price 
at conventional levels of statistical significance, and suggests the instruments used are necessary. 
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Random Coefficients Logit Model of Demand 
Results from the random coefficients logit (RCM) specification of the demand model are 
presented in columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Table 2.3. The coefficient estimate of price in the 
RCM model is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical 
significance. Column (4) reports parameters that capture consumer taste variation unobserved by 
the researchers for various product characteristics. The estimated effects are statistically and 
economically significant, suggesting that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their 
marginal disutility for price changes of yogurt products.  
Consumers tend to prefer yogurt products that are Greek within each year. This result is 
evident from the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate on 
the yogurt_style*𝜏𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 interaction variable. Furthermore, the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on the interaction variable of yogurt_style with household income suggests that lower-
income consumers have relatively stronger preferences for Greek-style yogurt. The positive but 
not statistically significant coefficient estimate on the interaction of the Greek dummy 
with Number of Children indicates families with or without kids are indifferent in choosing 
between Greek versus Non-Greek type yogurt products. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates on the advertising 
characteristics, Feature and Display suggest that advertised yogurt products are associated with 




 Table 2.3 Demand estimation results 
 
Standard Logit  Random Coefficients  Logit  
OLS 2SLS  GMM   
Mean Coef Mean Coef 
 
Mean Coef Standard Deviations 
 
 
Demographic Interactions  
  
(𝛼, 𝛽) (𝛼, 𝛽)  (𝛼, 𝛽) (𝜎) (Income) (N. Child) 
Price -11.018*** -18.809***  -30.973*** 7.250*** 2.324***  
 (0.064) (0.0183) 
 (0.904) (0.387) (0.152)  
Constant -10.064*** -8.803***  -7.576*** -0.093   
 (0.129) (0.137) 
 (0.148) (0.251)   
Yogurt Style (Greek=1)     0.237 -0.394*** 0.147 
     (0.323) (0.179) (311179.6) 
Yogurt Style (Greek=1)*Year(=2008) -0.307*** 0.390***  0.491***    
 (0.059) (0.063)  (0.142)    
Yogurt Style (Greek=1)*Year(=2009) 0.065* 0.976***  1.110***    
 (0.048) (0.054)  (0.126)    
Yogurt Style (Greek=1)*Year(=2010) 0.422*** 1.643***  1.594***    
 (0.100) (0.108)  (0.270)    
Yogurt Style (Greek=1)*Year(=2011) 0.335*** 1.060***  1.354***    
 (0.019) (0.024)  (0.083)    
Yogurt Style (Greek=1)*Year(=2012) 0.335**** 0.830***  1.161***    




   
 
Advertising    
Feature 0.521*** 0.274***  0.226***    
 (0.018) (0.019) 
 (0.0216)    
Display 1.476*** 1.506***  1.471***    
 (0.048) (0.050) 
 (0.0498)    
Fixed Effects        
County yes yes  yes    
Month yes yes  yes    
Year yes yes  yes    





   
 
Exogeneity Test for IVs   
Wu-Hausman  128703.848*** 
 




    
Other Statistics        
R2          0.934       
GMM Objective    29475.33    
# of Observations 188,074 188,074  188,074      
                   Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.5.2 Elasticities: 
Given the structural demand estimates, we compute price elasticities of demand for each 
differentiated product. Table 2.4 summarizes the estimated own-price elasticities by yogurt type. 
The average of own-price elasticities is -3.27, statistically significant at a 1% level. This result 
implies that a one percent increase in the price of yogurt products, on average, decreases the 
quantity consumed by 3.27%.  
The estimated own-price elasticities are in line with previous studies. For example, 
Draganska and Jain (2006) estimated average own-price elasticities of -4.25, and Villas-Boas 
(2007) find average own-price elasticity estimates of -5.9. For consumption goods, Pinkse and 
Slade (2004) estimate average own-price elasticities equal to -2 for beer in the UK, Nevo (2000a) 
finds that own-price elasticities for ready-to-eat cereals are approximately -4 on average in the US, 
Chintangunta et al. (2001) report own-price elasticities that range between -2 and -4. 
 
 Table 2.4 Average Own- price Elasticities 
All products Own- Price Elasticity  
Greek -4.380 (0.004) 
Non-Greek -2.979 (0.002) 
Average All -3.237 (0.002) 
                      Note: Standard error of the means reported in parentheses. 
 
2.5.3 Estimated Markup and Marginal Cost: 
Table 2.5 reports summary statistics on prices, computed markup and recovered marginal 
costs for a single pack, six-ounces yogurt. Each reported summary statistics in Table 2.5 has an 
associated sample standard error of mean reported in parentheses. The reported means of markup 
and marginal costs are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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 Table 2.5 Estimated marginal cost and markup for a single pack, 6-ounces yogurt 
  Product Markup Marginal Cost 
yogurt type Mean (SEM) Mean (SEM) 
Greek 0.0509 (0.0001) 0.1682 (0.0003) 
Non-Greek 0.0419 (0.00002) 0.1283 (0.0002) 
Average All 0.0435 (0.00002) 0.1015 (0.0001) 
                            Note: Standard error of the means reported in parentheses. 
On average, we observe the mean computed markup from Bertrand- Nash equilibrium is higher 
for Greek yogurt. The estimated marginal costs are on average $0.1015 per ounce and include 
retailers' costs and markup; which can be expected to be relatively high due to the short shelf life 
of the product.  
 
2.5.4 Counterfactual Experiment 
Product innovation is essential to the economic growth and development of accurate 
measures of the welfare gains from the introduction of new goods and the improvement in the 
quality of existing products is the aim of many studies. 
From the firm side, the incentives to introduce new brands come from the possibility of 
enjoying some transitory market power. Arrow (1962) and Schmalensee (1978) argue that product 
proliferation can deter entry. On the other hand, a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the 
imperfect competition and new goods is incomplete ((Breshnahan and Gordon, 1997)). One can 
expect that the new good is going to decrease the prices of competing goods, but there are no 
obvious prevailing effects concerning the price of the other brands of the introducer: Those prices 
could either fall -a cannibalization effect prevails-, or rise -the new brands allow the firm to enjoy 
some market power ((Breshnahan and Gordon, 1997)). 
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 In 2007, Chobani, currently one of the leading competitors in the U.S. yogurt market, 
introduced Greek-type yogurt. Within a few years, the company commands 37.6% of the Greek 
yogurt market and 19.8%  of the total spoonable yogurt market.15 Given the success of the 
introduction of a new type of yogurt, in this study, we would like to answer the question of “What 
would happen to the US yogurt market if we removed the Greek type yogurt?” and assess the 
impact of the introduction of Greek yogurt empirically on other types of yogurts.  To find the 
answer, we perform a counterfactual analysis where we remove the Greek yogurt products 
artificially from the choice set of consumers. 
 Given the supply model in Section 2.3.2., let Ω𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 be a matrix that describes the 
counterfactual ownership structure of the yogurt industry. Predicted counterfactual equilibrium 
prices, 𝑝∗, solve: 
Using the new equilibrium price vector, counterfactual predicted demand for Non-Greek type 
yogurts are calculated as follows: 
 
Interpretation of the Counterfactual Analysis 
 
15 http://www.smartbrief.com/s/2017/03/nielsen-chobani-leads-us-yogurt-market-share , accessed (May 3, 2018). 
  









Table 2.6 shows the predicted mean price change among Non-Greek products, predicted 
change in the quantity of Non-Greek yogurt products, and predicted change in the quantity of 
outside option. 
 The prices of Non-Greek-type yogurt products are predicted to increase by a mean 39.85% 
when Greek-type yogurt products are counterfactually removed. This evidence suggests that the 
presence of Greek-type products results in lower prices of Non-Greek type products.  
The counterfactual experiment results suggest that the expanded yogurt demand is shared 
by both types of yogurt products. In particular, our model predicts that markets experiencing a 
decrease in quantity demand for Non-Greek-type yogurt products by a mean 45.22% due to the 
counterfactual elimination of Greek-type yogurt products. This prediction implies that the presence 
of Greek yogurt products results in higher quantity demand for Non-Greek type yogurt products. 
With this finding in hand, rather than cannibalizes, the presence of Greek-type products expands 
the yogurt market. 
The evidence of the market expansion effect is inferred from the predicted changes in 
quantity demanded for the outside option. Recall that the outside option is the fraction of 
consumers not choosing to purchase any yogurt products. The predicted increase in quantity 
demanded of the outside option by a mean 1.12% implies that the presence of Greek-type yogurt 
products results in lower quantity demand for the outside option. A lower quantity demand for the 
outside option implies an expanded demand for the yogurt products in our data. Therefore, the 
presence of Greek-type yogurt products has a market expansionary effect within markets in our 
data. 
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Predicted Change in Quantity of 
Non-Greek products 
Predicted Change in 














Increase  Decrease Increase Yes No 
%∆ in Price %∆ in Quantity %∆ in Outside option   
39.8529 -45.2293 1.1156    
(3.1024) (4.3817) (0.1576)     
Note: Standard error of mean percentage change in parentheses. 
 
Demand Transfer Ratio 
We may also use a measure we call a demand transfer ratio to interpret the counterfactual 
outcomes. The demand transfer ratio measures the change in quantity demand of the outside option 
as a proportion of the quantity of the product(s) counterfactually eliminated from the market. Let 
us recall the commonly known diversion ratio that measures the fraction of consumers who 
switches from a product to an alternative due to an increase in the product's price. Here, our 
demand ratio is not equivalent but similar in spirit to a diversion ratio. In the case of demand 
transfer ratio, the stimulus for the demand transfer is the elimination of product(s), rather than a 
marginal price increase of the eliminated product(s), and the demand transfer explicitly measured 
is to an outside option rather than to products that were not eliminated from the demand system. 
The time series plot for the mean demand transfer ratio is shown in Figure 2.1. After the 
removal of Greek-type yogurt from the markets selling Greek-type yogurt, the change in quantity 
demand of outside option as a proportion of the quantity of Greek-type products artificially 
removed, demand transfer ratio (R), is greater than 1. Among all possible scenarios presented in 
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Table 2.7, our calculated mean demand transfer ratio satisfies Scenario 1. Let’s examine the 
outcomes of a mean demand transfer ratio below: 
 
 Table 2.7 Using Demand Transfer Ratio, R, to Interpret Counterfactual Outcomes 
Scenario Demand Transfer 
Ratio: Predicted 
Quantity Change in 
Outside option 
divided by Quantity 
of Single-cup 










increasing effect on 
Auto-drip Products 
due to the Presence of 




products presence on 
Auto-drip Demand 
1 R > 1 Yes No Yes No 
2 R = 1 Yes No No No 
3 0 < R < 1 Yes No No Yes 
4 R = 0 No No No Yes 




 Figure 2.1 Mean demand transfer ratio by month and year over time 
 
• Evidence of market expansion effect 
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A demand transfer ratio greater than one, i.e., R>1, means that the quantity of outside 
option is predicted to increase due to the counterfactual elimination of Greek-type yogurt products. 
In other words, the presence of Greek-type yogurt products causes the quantity of outside option 
to be smaller than it would be otherwise.  
 
• Evidence of Demand-increasing Effect on Non-Greek Products due to the Presence of 
Greek-type products  
When the demand transfer ratio is greater than one, i.e., R>1, there is evidence of the 
expanded yogurt demand shared by both types of yogurt styles, i.e., Greek versus Non-Greek. The 
portion of Non-Greek yogurt demand transferred to the outside option due to the counterfactual 
elimination of Greek-type products is a measure of the demand increasing impact the presence of 
Greek-type yogurts has on Non-Greek yogurt products. In other words, the presence of Greek 
yogurt products causes the demand for Non-Greek type products to be larger than it would be 
otherwise. 
 
• Evidence of cannibalizing effect of Non-Greek products on Greek-type demand 
When the demand transfer ratio is greater than one, i.e., R>1, there is no cannibalizing 
effects on Non-Greek yogurt demand associated with the presence of Greek-type yogurt products. 
The reason is that when Greek-type yogurt products are counterfactually eliminated, the demand 
transfer ratios greater than one implies that all the demand for Greek-type yogurt products is 
transferred to the outside option. In other words, no portion of the demand for Greek-type yogurt 
products displaces demand for Non-Greek-type yogurt products since none of the Greek-type 
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demand switches to Non-Greek products when Greek-type yogurt products are counterfactually 
eliminated.     
Overall, demand transfer ratio results are consistent with our findings with respect to 
change in predicted price, quantity demand, and outside option of Non-Greek products after the 
removal of Greek-style yogurt products. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper considers the recent introduction and rise in popularity of Greek yogurt in the 
U.S. yogurt industry and analyzes its market impacts on the yogurt industry with a structural 
econometric model. The empirical methodology begins with estimating the demand side 
parameters in a structural econometric model of differentiated products of consumer choice. With 
the consumer’s preference parameters in hand, we then performed a counterfactual experiment in 
which we artificially removed Greek-type products from consumers’ choice set and measured the 
model’s predicted changes in prices and quantity demanded Non-Greek type products.  
Our empirical model suggests that consumers tend to prefer Greek-type yogurts compared 
to Non-Greek type yogurts. In addition, consumers' socioeconomic status plays an important role 
in their yogurt consumption: Lower-income households consume more Greek-style yogurt than 
their high-income households. On average, consumers are more responsive to price changes in 
Greek yogurt products compared to non-Greek types. 
The counterfactual analysis result shows that Greek-type products result in lower prices of 
Non-Greek-type products by a mean 39.85%. Due to the counterfactual elimination of Greek 
yogurt products, Non-Greek type yogurt products experience a decrease in their quantity demand 
by a mean 45.22%. This prediction implies that the presence of Greek yogurt products increases 
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the quantity demand for Non-Greek type yogurt products. After the introduction of Greek yogurt, 
the outside option decrease by a mean 1.12%.  A lower quantity demand for the outside option 
implies an expanded demand for yogurt products. Therefore, the presence of Greek-type yogurt 
products has an expansionary market effect. 
Our analysis reveals that the introduction of Greek yogurt expanded the U.S. yogurt 
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Chapter 3 - License Suspension for Default Laws, Cohort Default 
Rates, and Student’s College Choice 
 3.1 Introduction 
The amount of outstanding student loan debt continues to rise and currently stands at $1.71 
trillion (The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2021a)). Student loan default is 
an important policy concern; for example, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 
(CARES Act) allows the U.S. Department of Education to suspend payments on student loans, 
stop collections on defaulted loans and use a 0% interest rate due to economic challenges 
surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic (Federal Student Aid (2021)). One policy aimed at reducing 
student loan default that has received little attention by researchers is the 1990 recommendation 
by the U.S. Department of Education that states should “deny professional licenses to defaulters 
until they take steps to repayment” (Farrell (1990)). Since this recommendation was made, several 
states have implemented policies to deny, revoke or suspend various licenses due to student loan 
nonpayment. These laws are referred to as “License Suspension for Default Laws” (LSD laws).16 
The types of licenses may include occupational licenses (for example, teaching or nursing), and in 
some states it even includes a driver's license.  
Policymakers in states implementing LSD laws argue that the threat of losing a license is 
a powerful incentive to continue making timely student loan payments; hence, they are a way to 
decrease student loan default. Opponents of such laws argue that they are counterproductive, as 
 
16 Here after we use LSD laws and policy interchangeably for license suspension for default laws. 
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revoking occupational licenses or drivers’ licenses will only make it harder to financially be able 
to repay and will thus increase student loan default. Thus, it is important to empirically estimate 
the impact of LSD laws on default behavior.  
We first estimate the extent that cohort default rates (CDRs) of colleges influence students’ 
school enrollment choice, and how LSD policies further influence this relationship. Since there are 
numerous costs associated with defaulting on a student loan, one may wish to attend colleges with 
lower CDRs since it may indicate that it will be easier to repay one’s own student loan debt after 
leaving school.  
Even though LSD laws may increase students’ awareness of CDRs when making a college 
choice, the impact of LSD laws on CDRs is not determined solely by students’ response to the 
policy, but also by schools’ response. Bound and Turner (2017) show that larger cohorts have 
lower college completion rates because of reductions in per-pupil resources. These reductions in 
degree completion could then increase CDRs since Dynarski (2016) finds student loan default is 
an earnings problem and not a debt problem. So, even when students respond to LSD laws by 
being more diligent to avoid loan default, school’s response (or lack thereof) in relation to per-
pupil resources can counter students’ response, causing the net impact of the LSD policy on cohort 
default rates to be either negative or positive, a feature of LSD policy that has not been studied and 
documented in the literature. Thus, the relative strength of the behavioral responses of students 
and schools will determine the impact of the policy on CDRs. We therefore contribute to the 
literature by estimating a behavioral model of the impact of LSD laws that considers both student 
and school responses. 
Our analysis relies heavily on tools and techniques popularly used in the empirical 
industrial organization literature. We first estimate the preference parameters of a structural 
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empirical model of students’ college choice. We use variation across states and across times in 
implementation of LSD laws to identify structural preference parameters that capture the impact 
of LSD laws on students’ school choice. Our empirical finding suggests that a colleges’ cohort 
default rate negatively influences students’ choice of attending the college. This is consistent with 
Cellini, Darolia, and Turner (2020) which shows large negative impacts on enrollment resulting 
from CDR related sanctions being imposed. Furthermore, mean elasticity estimates from our 
school choice model reveal that in making their college enrollment choice, students become almost 
75% more sensitive to schools’ cohort default rate when LSD laws are active compared to if these 
laws were repealed. Our model estimates also suggest that the socioeconomic status of students 
plays a significant role in their college choice. Based on our findings, students from high-income 
households have a stronger preference for enrolling in colleges with relatively lower cohort default 
rates compared to their low-income peers. 
The estimated structural model is then used to perform counterfactual policy analyses in 
which we repeal the LSD laws from adopting states and measure the predicted impact on schools’ 
CDRs. Our empirical findings suggest that the policy has mixed results on CDRs as we would 
theoretically expect. In some states, schools’ response to the policy counters and dominates the 
students’ response, causing an increase in their cohort default rates by a mean 5.57%. While, in 
other states, students’ response to the policy counters and dominates the schools’ response, causing 
a decrease in their cohort default rates by a mean 29.42%. From a policy efficacy perspective, our 
results suggest that it is important that policymakers consider behavioral responses of both students 
and schools when evaluating LSD laws’ effect on cohort default rates. 
Our analysis contributes to the literature on why people default on student loans. Abraham, 
Filiz-Ozbay, Ozbay and Turner (2020) and Cox, Kreisman and Dynarski (2020) focus on the role 
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of the choice of repayment plan in experimental settings. Abraham et al. (2020) find that framing 
of plans matters for whether income-based plans are more appealing than the standard plan and 
Cox et al. (2020) find that people pick sub-optimal plans due to automatically being defaulted into 
a plan and staying with the default. Herbst (2020) also studies the role of income-based repayment 
plans but instead focuses on the role of student loan servicing companies. Using a leave-one-out 
IV strategy he finds that having a more helpful customer service representative leads to increases 
in income-driven repayment plans and reductions in delinquencies. Barr, Bird and Castleman 
(2019) conduct an experiment at a community college in which students could have one-on-one 
assistance from a loan counselor. While it was successful at reducing student loan debt, the 
intervention led to increased student loan default as well. This finding of lower amounts of student 
loans leading to increased default is consistent with the findings in Black, Denning, Dettling, 
Goodman, and Turner (2020) which used variation in student loan limits across time to estimate 
effects. We thus contribute to this literature by documenting that LSD laws impact default. 
Another strand of the higher education literature studies school choice and its relationship 
to socioeconomic status using empirical industrial organization tools (Hastings et al (2009); Brand 
and Xie (2010); Dillon and Smith (2013); Ajayi (2011)). While sharing a similar methodological 
approach to this strand of the higher education literature, our study differs in the following ways: 
(i) use of state-level varying policy adoption on student loan default; (ii) consideration of cohort 
default rate as a school attribute that influences students’ college choice; (iii) the inclusion of 
household income, race, and gender as observed sources of students’ preference heterogeneity; 
and (iv) using institution-level data as oppose to individual-choice data to draw inference on 
preference parameters that drive students’ school choice behavior. 
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The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on License 
Suspension for Default Laws, consequences of student loan default and CDRs. Section 3 
introduces the College Scorecard data set. Section 4 describes both the difference-in-differences 
strategy that motivates the structural model and the structural model. Section 5 explains the 
estimation and identification strategies. Section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 provides the main 
conclusions of the paper. 
3.2 Background 
3.2.1 License Suspension for Default Laws 
In the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Education recommended that states adopt laws 
requiring regulatory boards to suspend professional licenses, and even drivers’ licenses, if the 
board received notice from an education commission informing them an applicant held outstanding 
student loans that were not being paid. Since then, 23 states have implemented some form of 
license suspension for default (LSD) law (National Consumer Law Center (2014)). Some states 
have since repealed their law. Table 1 provides a list of states implementing and some subsequently 
repealing LSD laws with effective dates.  
The National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL) and National Consumer Law Center 
report that some states only revoke licenses for defaulting on a state student loan. In contrast, other 
states using LSD laws consider default on any federal or state student loan as a trigger for applying 
punitive consequences under these laws. For example, in Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Texas, LSD laws require all occupational boards to 
revoke licenses for defaulting on any federal or state education loan. In contrast, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi only revoke licenses if the professional has defaulted on an education loan issued by 
the state (Wagner (2018)). This is an important distinction given the recent federally proposed 
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legislation to end these practices. Sibilla (2019) reports that Senator Rubio and Senator Warren re-
introduced the Protecting JOBs Act which would ban states from revoking, denying, or suspending 
state licenses for defaulting on a student loan made, insured, or guaranteed under Title IV. Since 
state loans are completely separate from Title IV, defaulting on state loans would still be subject 
to these state laws. 
The type of licenses that are impacted by LSD laws vary by the state. For example, 
Arkansas, California, Mississippi, Minnesota, and Florida revoke only health care professionals' 
licenses for defaulting on education loans. In Arkansas and Mississippi, the laws are applied to 
state health care education loans and scholarship agreements. On the other hand, Iowa and South 
Dakota suspend all the state-issued licenses, including drivers and recreational hunting licenses. 
 
 Table 3.1 States that revoke licenses for unpaid student loans 
States Law is active since Law is repealed 
Alaska 2011 2018 
Arkansas 2012 - 
California 2003 - 
Florida 2016 - 
Georgia 2010 - 
Hawaii 2002 - 
Illinois* 1996 2018 
Iowa 2013 - 
Kentucky 2002 2019 
Louisiana 1990 - 
Massachusetts 2006 - 
Minnesota 2001 - 
Mississippi 1999 - 
Montana 1999 2015 
New Jersey 1999 2016 
New Mexico 1993 2020 
North Dakota 2014 2018 
Oklahoma 2014 2016 
South Dakota 2015 - 
Tennessee# 1999 2018 
Texas 2005 - 
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Virginia 2003 2018 
Washington 1996 2018 
Note: *Silver-Greenberg, Cowley and Kitroeff (2019) report Illinois started their policies in the 1980s while the 
National Consumer Law Center reported the start being 1996. Bregel (2011) reports Tennessee only started enforcing 
their law in 2009 after an audit required them to do so. 
There is also variation in how strictly LSD laws are enforced. The National Conference of 
State Legislator (NCSL)17 and Wagner (2018) reported that “Boards in Louisiana, Tennessee and 
Texas, are considered to be more aggressive with enforcement, while officials in Alaska, Iowa, 
Hawaii, and Massachusetts have said their LSD laws are not being enforced.” Unfortunately, 
available data are not sufficient to show how many of these default notices result in license 
suspension, as enforcement is up to state boards. Silver-Greenberg, Cowley, and Kitroeff (2017) 
report using public records requests to get some information about LSD law usage. They were able 
to find 8,700 instances of the laws being used in recent years, although caution that this measure 
is likely underestimating the true impact. 
 
3.2.2 Costs to Non-payment Aside from LSD Laws  
Students may try to avoid schools with higher CDRs even in the absence of LSD laws 
because of numerous costs to defaulting on a student loan. For example, when borrowers default 
on their federal student loan, the federal government can garnish their wages, seize their tax 
refunds, impose collection costs, initiate litigation, and restrict borrowers from receiving additional 
federal student aid or Social Security benefits (Looney (2019)). Gaulke and Reynolds (2020) show 
that becoming delinquent on a student loan (missing a payment) results in a drop in Equifax Risk 
 
17 https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/license-suspension-for-student-loan-
defaulters.aspx, accessed (February 18, 2021). 
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Scores (Equifax’s version of a credit score) of around 50-60 points. This means that it will be much 
harder to get a new line of credit and would also be considerably more costly to do so.  
Internet search data provide some evidence that individuals are interested in knowing the 
negative consequences of defaulting on student loans. For example, Figure 3.1 shows the “interest 
over time” of Google searches looking up: “What happens when you default on a student loan?” 
18 Google Trend, measured on the vertical axis, captures the “interest over time” in the search 
phrase described above, with the highest value being 100, corresponding to peak popularity; a 
value of 50 corresponding to half of peak popularity, and a value of zero meaning not enough 
internet data for the searched phrase. 
 





ult%20on%20a%20student%20loan, accessed (April 3, 2021). 
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3.2.3 Why Schools Care about Student Loan Default: Cohort Default 
Rates  
(Two-year) CDRs are calculated as the percentage of federal student loan borrowers who 
enter repayment in a fiscal year and default by the end of the next fiscal year.19 The United States 
Department of Education releases CDR data once per year. Nationally, CDRs average around 9 
percent and have steadily increased since 2005 (Looney (2011)).  
College and universities should care about their CDRs. Having too high of a CDR can 
result in their students losing access to federal financial aid. For example, if a college’s cohort 
default rate hits 30% for three consecutive years, or 40% in a given year, then students at that 
institution would no longer be able to receive federal Pell Grants or borrow federal student loans, 
which could substantially increase the cost of attendance (Webber and Rogers (2014); Hillman 
(2015); Jaquette and Hillman (2015)). Second, Cellini, Darolia, and Turner (2020) use variation in 
CDR related sanctions across schools and time to show that it negatively impacts student 
enrollment. Specifically, after a for-profit school receives a sanction there is a 68% decrease in 
annual enrollment and much of that is offset by students attending public schools instead.  
 
3.3   Data 
The dates for states implementing and repealing LSD laws come from a variety of sources. 
While the National Consumer Law Center (2014) had dates through 2014, to obtain more recent 
dates we had to compile information from many other sources. These sources include Justia 
(2006), Justia (2014), New Jersey Legislature (2016), Montana Legislature (2015), House of 
 
19 https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html, accessed (April 3, 2021). 
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Washington State (2017), North Dakota Legislature (2014), Sibilla (2019), Gettings, St. George, 
Piepgrass, Wingfield and Shachmurove (2018), Wagner (2018), Dieterle, Weissman and Watson 
(2018), Walker (2017), and Hicks (2015). 
The rest of the data come from the College Scorecard, which is available through the United 
States Department of Education College Scorecard database.20 This database was developed 
during the Obama Administration, and debuted in 2015 as a website tool to provide additional 
information to potential college students. The Department of Education provides underlying 
university-level data dating back to the 1996-1997 academic year and updates the data annually. 
The data on student loans are aggregated based on the National Student Loan Data System, which 
is used by the federal government to administer financial aid. General information about the 
universities come from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). IPEDS is 
an annual survey of institutions that are eligible, or applying to be eligible, for federal financial 
aid. A unit of observation in our data sample is a school in a particular year.  
In terms of sample selection, we focus on schools that are offering four-year tertiary 
education programs mainly because of the way we construct the market share. Since we assume 
the set of potential students is based on the number of high school graduates in each state across 
time, this assumption is more realistic for the four-year sector than the two-year sector in which 
there are many more non-traditional students. We drop observations for which an institution’s total 
student enrollment is not reported, as this prevents constructing the observation value of a key 
outcome variable for our empirical model. In addition, we remove observations that do not report 
cohort default rate, as this is a key control variable of interest in our empirical model. As previous 
 
20 https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/data/, accessed (February 18, 2021). 
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research has shown that for-profit schools are associated with higher rates of student loan default, 
implying that it is important to know the type of school, we drop observations that do not report 
the level of control with respect to public, private, or for-profit. Lastly, we remove universities that 
aggregate payment outcomes across multi-branch campuses, and universities that do not receive 
financial aid. The resulting sample contains 2,045 universities across 50 states and the District of 
Colombia, of which, 581 are public four-year, 1,222 are private non-profit, and 242 are private 
for-profit universities.  
Due to concerns over schools `gaming the system’ related to two-year CDRs, starting in 
FY2009 the Department of Education began evaluating universities based on three-year cohort 
default rates. After this change, the College Scorecard continued to report the two-year cohort 
default rate through FY2010; however, the subsequent years only included the three-year cohort 
default rate. Due to the change in the cohort default metric, we restrict our sample to years in which 
the two-year cohort default rate in the available - years FY1996 to FY2010.  
Given the years of data available to us, the states that are identifying the treatment effects 
of LSD laws are California, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. In other words, these are the states that 
have implemented LSD laws at some point during the time span of our sample period.   
Gross et al. (2009), Kelchen and Li (2017), Scott-Clayton (2018), Hillman (2014) show 
that students’ household income, parental education level, and race/ethnicity influence their school 
choice. To consider the influence of socioeconomic status on college choice, we supplement the 
College Scorecard data with demographic data on household income, race, and gender from the 
U.S. Census Integrated Public Microdataset Sample (IPUMS).  Table 2 provides descriptive 
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statistics on our variables, and Table 3 shows summary statistics for school characteristics by type 
in our sample. 
In our study, students are facing a choice set that includes alternate 4-year colleges within 
their state, s, at time, t. Thus, each choice set, or tertiary educational market, is defined as a unique 
combination of state and year. Given 14 years of data and 50 states with the District of Columbia, 
there are 714 defined tertiary educational markets. Each student chooses whether to enroll in a 
college by observing various characteristics of each school that includes its type (public, private 
for-profit, private non-profit), cohort default rate, and various attributes observable to the student 
but unobservable to us the researchers.   
We use a discrete choice model similar to discrete choice models of demand found in the 
Empirical Industrial Organization literature (for example, see Berry (1994); Berry, Levinsohn and 
Pakes (1995); Nevo (2000); and Villas-Boas (2007)). In our setting, the discrete choice model 
requires computing school enrollment market shares, as well as the share of students who choose 
the outside option in each state for a given year. The outside option includes choosing not to attend 
a 4-year college within the defined tertiary educational market in which the student’s household is 
located. Since we want to capture the extent to which students’ school choice is influenced by 
colleges’ cohort default rate, and the state’s implementation of LSD laws, we restrict our focus to 
samples of students choosing to remain within the state after college graduation. The logic is that 
if student i choosing college j in state 𝑠 when LSD law is active in time t, then LSD law would 
bind and have an impact on the student after graduation. To obtain the percentage of students 
staying within the state after graduation, we use IPUMS data and focus on individuals within age 
group 21- 24 with a college degree, and their residency information five years prior. 
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To define the potential enrollment size within a defined tertiary educational market, we 
follow the scaling factor methodology used by Ivaldi and Verboven (2005), which involves 
computing the potential enrollment size by scaling up the actual state by year student enrollment 
by a factor. Using the fact that from year 2000 through year 2017, 44% of high-school graduates 
enrolled in four-year institutions, we set our scaling factor to 2.272 (= 1/0.44), and use this scaling 
factor for computing the potential enrollment size in each defined tertiary educational market. The 
observed enrollment share associated with each school in a given state and year is computed by 
dividing the school’s total undergraduate within-state enrollment level by the potential enrollment. 
After calculating the observed enrollment shares of each school (i.e., the observed probability of 
choosing each school within a given state in a given year), the share of the outside option is simply 
one minus the sum of the observed shares across schools within a given state and year. 
 
3.4 Econometric Model of the Education Market 
Our empirical methodology begins by using reduced-form regression equations to 
investigate whether schools in states with LSD laws differ in their cohort default rates. The 
reduced-form regression equations rely on a difference-in-differences identification strategy 
driven by variations in states’ timing of LSD policy implementation. Motivated by evidence from 
the reduced-form regression analyses, we then formally specify and estimate a structural model of 
students’ college preferences, where each student faces a choice set that includes different type 
colleges with varying cohort default rates, as well as the outside option of not choosing one of the 
colleges within the student’s tertiary educational market. With the estimated school choice 
preference parameters in hand, we then recover the elasticity of students’ college enrollment 
choice with respect to cohort default rate. In the final step of the empirical methodology, we 
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perform counterfactual policy analyses in which we artificially remove the LSD laws in states that 
have them and measure the model-predicted changes in CDRs and responsiveness of students’ 




 Table 3.2 Summary statistics 
Description Mean S.D. Min Max 
Federal Student Loan Interest Rate 6.626 1.922 3.28 8.99 
Inflation Rate 2.403 0.93 -0.355 3.839 
Unemployment Rate 5.579 1.838 2.5 13.7 
















Notes: For the zero-one dummy variable, Gender, females are coded as 1. The zero-one dummy variable, Race, categorizes individuals as either being white or 
non-white, with white being coded as 1. 
 
  
 Table 3.3 Institution Characteristics by type 
  All Institutions Public Private Non-profit Private For-profit 
 (n=2045) (n=581) (n=1222) (n=242) 
Description Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
         
Default Rate 0.0528 (0.044) 0.0552 (0.0381) 0.0464 (0.0444) 0.0949 (0.0519) 
Undergraduate Enrollment 4325.88 (5932.20) 9331.554 (7642.51) 1982.51 (2346.76) 1671.17 (3940.57) 
%Women 0.5667 (0.1513) 0.5541 (0.0961) 0.5834 (0.1562) 0.4853 (0.2456) 
%Men 0.4332 (0.1513) 0.4458 (0.0961) 0.4165 (0.1562) 0.5146 (0.2456) 
Undergraduate Enrollment  2992.274 (4120.814) 6473.319 (5333.997) 1370.904 (1610.247) 1079.027 (2579.392) 
(Within State)         
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3.4.1 Reduced-form Regression Analysis: Difference-in-Differences 
We first use reduced-form regressions to test whether the implementation of LSD laws 
impacts schools’ cohort default rates. The identification comes from differences across states 
regarding whether and when they implement the law. Specifically, we are comparing differences 
in schools’ cohort default rate over time in the treated states with differences in schools’ cohort 
default rate over time in the control states. We use the following reduced-form regression model 
specification: 
 
𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 =  𝜋𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑠𝑡 +𝑀𝑠𝑡𝜌 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑗 + 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜍𝑗𝑠𝑡  (1) 
 
where in equation (1), 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 represents the cohort default rate at school 𝑗 located in state 𝑠 in 
year 𝑡. 𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑠𝑡, our main variable of interest, is a state-by-year dummy variable that switches from 
“0” to “1” in the year of LSD law implementation and remains a “1” in the years after 
implementation provided the laws are not repealed. 𝜋 is our reduced-form parameter of interest 
that captures the impact of LSD laws on CDR rates. 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑗 captures school-specific fixed effects; 
𝑀𝑠𝑡 is a vector of controls including state-by-year unemployment rates, state-by-year per capita 
income, and state-by-year merit scholarship status, with associated parameter vector 𝜌. 
Macroeconomic conditions could also impact student loan default, so we also include year fixed 
effects (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡). We also control for state-specific linear time trends with ( 𝑠𝑡). Standard errors 
are clustered at the state given that is the level at which these licensing policies took effect. 
It is important to recognize that the reduced-form parameter, 𝜋, in equation (1) nests the 
behavioral responses of both students and schools to implementation of the LSD policy. In the 
event that schools’ behavioral response to the policy counters students’ response, then the sign of 
𝜋 may be either negative or positive depending on the relative strengths of the behavioral responses 
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from the two groups. A key reason for expanding the analysis to include a structural model is to 
disentangle the behavioral responses of students from schools to allow for a better understanding 
of the impacts of the policy. However, a good starting point is to get a sense of what the reduced-
form parameter estimates of 𝜋 look like.   
Our methodological framework is analogous to a typical demand and supply model used 
for analyzing equilibrium market outcomes resulting from simultaneous shifts in demand and 
supply. For example, consider 𝑄𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑝, 𝑋𝑑; Θ𝑑) and 𝑄
𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑝, 𝑋𝑠; Θ𝑠) as representing the 
structural market demand and supply equations, respectively, where 𝑄𝑑 and 𝑄𝑠 represent quantity 
demand and quantity supply, respectively; 𝑝 represents price; 𝑋𝑑 a vector of demand shifting 
variables; Θ𝑑 a vector of structural demand parameters; 𝑋
𝑠 a vector of supply shifting variables; 
and Θ𝑠 a vector of structural supply parameters. Imposing the market equilibrium condition, 𝑄
𝑑 =
𝑄𝑠, allows us to equate the structural demand and supply equations, the result of which can yield 
a reduced-form price equation, 𝑝 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑑, 𝑋𝑠; 𝜋), where 𝜋 is a vector of reduced-form parameters 
that nests combinations of the structural parameters, i.e., 𝜋 = 𝑓(Θ𝑑 , Θ𝑠).   
In applying the market demand and supply modelling framework to our present study, 
𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 is the equivalent of market price, and therefore 𝑝 = 𝑓(𝑋
𝑑, 𝑋𝑠; 𝜋) is analogous to reduced-
form equation (1) above. In addition, 𝑄𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑝, 𝑋𝑑; Θ𝑑) is analogous to the student school choice 
side of the structural model we subsequently specify, while 𝑄𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑝, 𝑋𝑠; Θ𝑠) analogous to the 
school attribute choice side of the structural model. A situation of importance for our study is that 
𝑋𝑑 and 𝑋𝑠 share a common variable, which in our study is the LSD policy variable. Furthermore, 
the LSD policy variable impacts 𝑄𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑝, 𝑋𝑑; Θ𝑑) based on a subset of structural parameters in 
Θ𝑑, while impacting 𝑄
𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑝, 𝑋𝑠; Θ𝑠) based on a subset of structural parameters in Θ𝑠. As such, 
when we obtain an estimate of reduced-form parameter, 𝜋, from equation (1) above, it nests the 
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structural impacts of the LSD policy through 𝜋 = 𝑓(Θ𝑑, Θ𝑠). Therefore, subsequently obtaining 
estimates of all parameters in Θ𝑑 and Θ𝑠 should provide deeper insights on the impacts of the LSD 
law policy. 
The results from the difference-in-differences reduced-form regressions are shown in Table 
4. In column (1) of Table 3.4, we report the average effect of the LSD laws on the CDRs for 
schools located in states with active LSD laws. The reduced-form parameter estimate capturing 
the average policy effect in column (1) does not reveal any evidence of average difference in 
changes in schools’ CDR in states with LSD laws versus states without LSD laws. In column (2), 
we break out the average policy effect by states. These results now show clear heterogeneity across 
states such that some states have overall higher CDRs after LSD implementation and other states 
have overall lower CDRs after implementation. As such, the reduced-form estimates reveal that 
the LSD policy has mixed results on impacting CDR, which is contrary to a key goal of the policy 
of reducing student loan default. To better understand reasons for these mixed reduced-form 
results, we now turn to our structural model of students’ school choice.        
 
 Table 3.4 Differences- in- differences on CDR 
 (1) (2) 
 CDR CDR 
On Average 0.00268  
 (0.00312)  
   
California (LSD=1)  0.00354* 
  (0.00195) 
Georgia (LSD=1)  0.00866*** 
  (0.00208) 
Hawaii (LSD=1)  0.00967*** 
  (0.00292) 
Kentucky (LSD=1)  -0.00638*** 
  (0.00184) 
Massachusetts (LSD=1)  -0.000698 
  (0.0021) 
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Minnesota (LSD=1)  0.0575* 
  (0.00326) 
Mississippi (LSD=1)  0.00736*** 
  (0.00268) 
Montana (LSD=1)  0.0236*** 
  (0.00292) 
New Jersey (LSD=1)  -0.00469** 
  (0.00216) 
Tennessee (LSD=1)  -0.0179*** 
  (0.0027) 
Texas (LSD=1)  0.0146*** 
  (0.00192) 
Virginia (LSD=1)  0.00593*** 
  (0.00181) 
Constant 5.597*** 5.519*** 
 (0.998) (1.009) 
Fixed Effects   
Year yes yes 
School yes yes 
State specific linear time trends yes yes 
   
Observations 21,552 21,552 
R-squared 0.786 0.787 
Note: The regression above includes controls for state-level per capita income, unemployment rate, and 
merit scholarship status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.4.2 Structural Model of Students’ School Choice 
We use a random coefficients logit model to estimate students' enrollment decisions and 
related cohort default rate elasticities (Berry (1994); Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)). For the 
schools located in state 𝑠 during time 𝑡, there are 𝐿𝑠𝑡 potential students who may enroll in a college. 
A typical student 𝑖 can choose to either enroll in one of the 𝐽𝑠𝑡 schools, where schools are indexed 
by 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽𝑠𝑡, or otherwise choose the outside option (𝑗 = 0), allowing for the possibility of 
student 𝑖 not enrolling in one of the 𝐽𝑠𝑡 colleges in the state. Therefore, student 𝑖 chooses between 
𝐽𝑠𝑡 + 1 alternatives in state 𝑠 during time 𝑡. Student i’s conditional indirect utility for the outside 
good is 𝑢𝑖0𝑡 = 𝑖0𝑠𝑡, while for schools 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽𝑠𝑡 it is: 
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where 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 is the two-year cohort default rate. The parameter, 𝛼𝑖, captures student-specific 
valuations for schools’ cohort default rate characteristic. 𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑠𝑡  is a zero-one dummy variable that 
takes a value of ‘1’ in the year of LSD laws implementation in state 𝑠, and remains ‘1’ in 
subsequent years provided the laws are not repealed. 𝛾 is a parameter that captures students’ mean 
valuation of LSD laws. Parameter 𝛽 captures the extra mean valuation students place on the cohort 
default rate attribute of colleges when choosing to enroll in a college that is in a state with active 
LSD laws. 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 × 𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑠𝑡 is the interaction variable of interest that enables identification of 𝛽.  
𝑋𝑠𝑡 is a vector of controls including state-by-year unemployment rates, state-by-year per capita 
income, and state-by-year merit scholarship status, with associated parameter vector Φ; 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 
captures time (year) fixed effects; 𝑠𝑡 represents state-specific linear time trends; 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑗  captures 
school-specific fixed effects; and 𝜉𝑗𝑠𝑡  captures time-varying school characteristics (i.e., quality, 
reputation, opportunities for scholarships and grants, various initiatives schools may implement 
that directly or indirectly subsidize students’ education costs, etc.) that are unobserved by us the 
researchers, but observed by students and therefore impact students’ utility. For example, Kansas 
State University facilitates a program called “Textbooks 2.0” that incentivizes instructors to choose 
“open source type” digital textbooks for their course in an attempt to reduce the cost of textbooks 
to students.21 In addition, Kansas State University offers “The Presidential Scholarship ($20,000 
 
21 https://stories.ksufoundation.org/503161-raised-for-textbooks-2-0-through-all-in-for-k-state/, accessed (April 5, 
2021). 
  
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 × 𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑠𝑡) + 𝑋𝑠𝑡Φ+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +  





per year)” to incoming freshman students with exceptional leadership and academic success.22 
These are examples of potentially time-varying school-specific attributes captured in the 
composite term 𝜉𝑗𝑠𝑡  , which are intended to lower the cost of education for students; and in turn 
lessen the amounts students may need to borrow to attend college. 𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 is a mean-zero stochastic 
error term. 
The distribution of student-specific taste parameter, 𝛼𝑖 , is specified as follows: 
 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜙𝐷𝑖 + 𝜎𝜗𝑖,      (3) 
where in equation (3), 𝛼 is the mean marginal valuation students place on schools’ cohort default 
rate attribute. 𝐷𝑖 is an m-dimensional column vector of demographic variables, while 𝜗𝑖  is an 
unobserved student’s preference draw for schools’ cohort default rate attribute. 𝜙 is a 1 × 𝑚 vector 
of parameters that measure how students’ valuation of schools’ cohort default rate attribute vary 
with demographics, and parameter, 𝜎, measures the variation in students’ heterogeneous 
valuations for schools’ cohort default rate attribute.  
Given the findings in Kelchen and Li (2017) and Scott-Clayton (2018), we consider 
household income, gender, and race as demographic variables in our estimation. Following the 
empirical industrial organization literature, we expressed the demographic variables in deviation 
from their respective means. Thus, the mean of 𝐷𝑖 in equation (3) is zero. As in Nevo (2000), we 
assume that 𝜗𝑖 has a standard normal distribution, 𝜗𝑖~N(0,1). The assumptions regarding 𝐷𝑖 and 




opportunities/freshman/competitive/presidential-scholarship.html, accessed (April 5, 2021). 
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We can break down the indirect utility into a mean utility, 𝛿𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑠𝑡 +
 𝛽(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 × 𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑠𝑡) + 𝑋𝑠𝑡Φ+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡   + 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗𝑠𝑡, and a deviation from this mean 
utility 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜗𝑖; 𝜙, σ ) = 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡(𝜙𝐷𝑖 + σ𝜗𝑖). As such, the indirect utility can be re-
written as: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡.       (4) 
For computational tractability, the idiosyncratic error term 𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 is assumed to be governed 
by an independent and identically distributed extreme value density. Individual student i’s 






      (5)  






𝑑𝐹(𝐷)̂𝑑𝐹(𝑣),     (6)  
where d𝐹(𝐷)̂ and 𝑑𝐹(𝑣) are population distribution functions for student demographics and 
random taste shocks assumed to be independently distributed. For the integral in equation (6), there 
is no closed-form solution. Thus, it must be approximated numerically by using random draws 
from 𝐹(𝐷)̂ and 𝐹(𝑣).23 
Finally, the enrollment for school 𝑗 is given by: 
𝑑𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝐿𝑠𝑡  ×  𝑠𝑗𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝐷𝑅, (𝐿𝑆𝐷 ×  𝐶𝐷𝑅), 𝑋, 𝜉; Θ𝑑),    (7)  
 
23 Following much of the Empirical Industrial Organization literature, we numerically approximate the 
integral by obtaining random draws from 𝐹(𝐷)̂ and 𝐹(𝑣). In the actual estimation of the discrete choice 
model, we use 300 individual draws from the U.S. Census Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample 









𝑖=1  , where 𝑛𝑠 is the number of random draws from the distribution of 𝐷 and 𝑣.   
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where in equation (7), 𝐿𝑠𝑡 is a measure of potential college enrollment in a given state 𝑠 at 
time 𝑡; 𝑠𝑗𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝐷𝑅, (𝐿𝑆𝐷 ×  𝐶𝐷𝑅), 𝑋, 𝜉; Θ𝑑) is the model-predicted share of school 𝑗;  𝐶𝐷𝑅, 
(𝐿𝑆𝐷 ×  𝐶𝐷𝑅), 𝑋 and  𝜉 are vectors of cohort default rate, cohort default rate and LSD law 
interaction, other control variables we previously describe, and the vector of school characteristics 
unobserved to us but observed by students, respectively; and Θ𝑑=(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾,Φ, , 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡, 
𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑗 , 𝜙, σ) is a vector of school choice model parameters to be estimated. 
 
Equilibrium Determination of Schools’ CDR 
Even though it is unreasonable to think that schools directly choose the cohort default rates 
we observe them to have, it is reasonable to think that schools’ cohort default rates are indirectly 
influenced by the choices schools make on several school attributes under their control. For 
example, schools do make choices on fundraising efforts to provide students with opportunities 
for scholarships and grants, which reduce students’ reliance on loans to cover the cost of their 
education. In addition, schools may pursue various initiatives that may directly or indirectly impact 
graduation rates and thus ability to repay loans. For examples, universities use first-year courses 
or communities aimed at helping students make the transition to college, provide tutoring and 
mentoring opportunities, and have programs aimed at improving retention of first-generation 
students or non-traditional students, etc. Schools may also invest in improving the quality of 
education they provide, as well as invest in building their reputation for consistently delivering a 
desirable standard of education, which in turn improve the competitiveness of their graduates in 
labor markets, and consequently lowers cohort default rate among the school’s graduates.       
In an effort to approximate schools’ choices to lower the effective cost to students of 
acquiring education, which influences a school’s cohort default rate, we adopt a simplified model 
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in which we assume schools optimally choose their cohort default rate conditional on the cohort 






[𝜓(1 − 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡)𝑞𝑗𝑠𝑡 −𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡)𝑞𝑗𝑠𝑡],  (8) 
where 𝑁𝑉𝑗𝑠𝑡 is the net value to school 𝑗 from producing non-defaulting graduates who pursue 
successful careers; 𝜓 is a parameter that measures the per student shadow value in monetary terms 
to the school from producing a non-defaulting graduate who pursues a successful career; 𝑞𝑗𝑠𝑡 
represents number of students choosing to enroll at school 𝑗 during period 𝑡; 𝜓(1 − 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝑞𝑗𝑠𝑡 
is the expected value in monetary terms to the school from producing non-defaulting graduates 
who pursue successful careers; and 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡) is the marginal cost per student, in monetary 
terms, the school incurs to reduce its cohort default rate, which we assume is a decreasing and 
convex function of the cohort default rate, i.e. 
𝜕𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑡
𝜕𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡
< 0 and 
𝜕2𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑡
𝜕𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡
2 > 0.   
Let the marginal cost function be specified as: 
 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑡 = −𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡) + 𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑡             (9) 
where 𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑡 is a composite of marginal cost components that do not vary with 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡. The specified 












2 > 0 since 0 < 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 <  1 . 
Even though the composite component of marginal cost captured by 𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑡 is not influenced 
by 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡, we do allow this composite cost component to be influenced by the LSD policy. 
Formally, we specify that: 
𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑡 =  𝜆(𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑠𝑡)+ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑗 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑠𝑡
𝑚𝑐     (10) 
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where, as previously defined, 𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑠𝑡 is a zero-one dummy variable for whether state 𝑠 at time 𝑡 has 
LSD law. Therefore, parameter 𝜆 captures the impact of LSD laws on the marginal cost per student 
a school faces to reduce its cohort default rate. Other included controls are: (i) 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑗 , 
representing school fixed effects that control for unobserved school characteristics; (ii) 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡, 
representing year fixed effects that control for time-varying macroeconomic conditions that may 
affect the marginal cost; and (iii) state-specific linear time trends, 𝑠𝑡, which could be picking up 
things like changes in state support to public schools over time. Last, 𝜖𝑗𝑠𝑡
𝑚𝑐 captures random shock 
components of the marginal cost that are unobserved to us the researchers but observed by schools 
and students. We assume that shock components captured by 𝜖𝑗𝑠𝑡
𝑚𝑐 are independently and 
identically distributed across schools, states, and time, with a mean of zero and a constant variance. 
The rationale guiding the specification of equation (10) is that with LSD laws in effect, 
schools may face a greater marginal cost per student to reduce its cohort default rate. There are 
numerous potential reasons for this. First, the students who have marginally greater access to 
resources outside the educational system will likely be incentivized by the LSD policy to 
increasingly tap these resources to mitigate the chances of student loan default. For example, 
Lochner, Stinebrickner, and Suleymanoglu (2021) show that parental support greatly reduces 
student loan repayment problems so students with higher income parents may further rely on their 
parents as insurance against non-payment after LSD laws are implemented. If students from higher 
income families are more likely to receive help from family resources after implementation of 
LSD laws, then the remaining students from lower income families who have less resources to fall 
back on in the case of a negative shock to their ability to repay will drive up schools’ marginal cost 
per student to help those students avoid default. Second, the supply of higher education is not 
perfectly elastic and therefore increased demand cannot always be accommodated without impacts 
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on quality of education provided (Bound and Turner (2007)). Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 
(2010) decompose the reason for reductions in college completion into changes in student 
preparation and changes in college characteristics and find that college characteristics play an 
important role, especially in the four-year sector. Overall, they find that reductions in student 
resources account for one third of the decline in completion rates. Thus, schools would face an 
increased marginal cost to have their students avoid default due to the reduced graduation rates 
and earnings potentials of their students.  
The arguments above suggest that 𝜆 > 0. If LSD laws serve to increase the marginal cost 
per student a school faces to reduce its cohort default rate, then optimizing behavior of the school 
would prescribe that it marginally reduces investments targeted at lowering its cohort default rate. 
In other words, schools’ optimal response to LSD laws may be counter to the objective of these 
laws, which is to reduce cohort default rates.       
We impose the equilibrium condition that the number of students who actually enroll in 
school 𝑗 during period 𝑡 is exactly equal to the number of student enrollees predicted by our 
discrete school choice model previously described. Therefore, we have 𝑞𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝑑𝑗𝑠𝑡 =
𝐿𝑠𝑡  ×  𝑠𝑗𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝐷𝑅, (𝐿𝑆𝐷 ×  𝐶𝐷𝑅), 𝑋, 𝜉; Θ𝑑) from equation (7). 
The schools’ optimization problem in equation (8) implies that each school’s optimal 
cohort default rate must satisfy the following first-order conditions in a Nash equilibrium of cohort 
default rates: 






] 𝑠𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 0,  ∀ 𝑗.  (11) 
The system of first-order conditions in (11) can be represented using matrix notation as follows: 
(𝐈 ∗ 𝚫) × [𝜓(𝟏 − 𝑪𝑫𝑹) −𝒎𝒄] − [𝜓𝐈 + 𝚪]𝒔(𝑪𝑫𝑹) = 𝟎  (12) 
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where 𝟏, 𝟎,  𝒔(∙), 𝑪𝑫𝑹 and 𝒎𝒄 are 𝐽 × 1 vectors of ones, zeros, school enrollment shares, cohort 
default rates, and marginal costs, respectively; 𝐈 is a 𝐽 × 𝐽 identity matrix; 𝚫 is a 𝐽 × 𝐽 matrix of 
first-order derivatives of predicted school enrollment shares with respect to cohort default rates; 
𝐈 ∗ 𝚫 is an element-by-element multiplication of the two matrices; and 𝚪 is a 𝐽 × 𝐽 diagonal matrix 




 The system of first-order conditions represented in equation (12) can be re-arranged as 
follows:   
(𝟏 − 𝑪𝑫𝑹) =
1
𝜓
𝒎𝒄+ (𝐈 ∗ 𝚫)−1 × [𝐈 + 𝚪]𝒔(𝑪𝑫𝑹)   (13) 
Equation (13) reveals that the shadow value parameter 𝜓 is not separately identified from marginal 
cost. As such, in what follows we assume a normalized value of 1 for 𝜓.   
 To estimate parameters in the marginal cost function, we substitute in equation (13) the 
assumed functional form for marginal cost and rearrange the resulting equation as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑪𝑫𝑹) + (𝟏 − 𝑪𝑫𝑹) − [𝐈 ∗ 𝚫]−1 × [𝐈 + 𝚪]𝒔(∙) = 𝒄(𝑳𝑺𝑫, 𝝐𝒎𝒄; 𝝀) (14) 
The left-hand-side of equation (14) is the computed dependent variable of the linear regression, 
while the right-hand-side of equation (14) has the specification described in equation (10). 
        
3.4.3 Measuring the responsiveness of students to cohort default rate 
when choosing a college 
With the arguments from the literature in hand (please see the Introduction section), we 
use our random coefficients logit model estimates to calculate the elasticity of enrollment to each 
school with respect to cohort default rate in states with LSD laws. 
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 The own-school cohort default rate elasticity is defined by: 
   
Given the negative consequences for defaulting on student loan repayment sanctioned by LSD 
laws, in this study, we answer the following question: “How sensitive are students to cohort default 
rates when making college enrollment decisions?” To answer this question, we use the students’ 
preference parameter estimates from our discrete school choice model along with equation (15) to 
compute own-school cohort default rate elasticities in states during periods when their LSD laws 
are active. We then re-compute the own-school cohort default rate elasticities for schools in the 
same set of states but counterfactually set to zero the LSD dummy variable, which allows for 
comparing factual cohort default rate elasticity estimates when LSD laws are active to model-
predicted cohort default rate elasticity estimates when LSD laws are counterfactually inactive. 
Thus, we can test whether LSD laws result in students becoming more sensitive to student loan 
default and change their behavior in a way that would reduce student loan default.  
 
3.5 Estimation and Identification 
To estimate the set of school choice preference parameters, we use generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) following the previous literature (Berry (1994); Berry, Levinson and Pakes 
(1995) (BLP); Nevo (2000); and Petrin (2002)). The general strategy is to derive parameter 
estimates such that the observed school enrollment shares, 𝑆𝑗𝑠𝑡, are equal to school enrollment 











∫(𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽) 𝑠𝑖𝑗(1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑗) 𝑑𝐹𝐷
∗(𝐷)̂  𝑑𝐹𝑣





The cohort default rate of a given college depends not only on the school characteristics 
observed by students and us the researchers, but also school characteristics observed by the 
students but not observed by us the researchers, i.e., school characteristics captured in 𝜉𝑗𝑠𝑡.  School-
specific characteristics in 𝜉𝑗𝑠𝑡 include, but not limited to: (i) potential earnings after graduating 
from the relevant school, which is positively correlated with the schools’ known quality of 
education and reputation; (ii) opportunities the school provides for scholarships and grants; and 
(iii) various school initiatives that directly or indirectly subsidize students’ education costs. As 
such, the components captured in 𝜉𝑗𝑠𝑡 are likely correlated with a school’s cohort default rate, 
making the 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡 variable in our discrete school choice model endogenous.  
To mitigate the endogeneity problem, we include school fixed effects, state-specific linear 
time trends, and year fixed effects controls in the mean utility function when estimating the discrete 
school choice model. However, instruments for cohort default rates are needed to deal with 
endogeneity problems that may remain even after controlling for school, state-specific linear time 
trends, and year fixed effects. 
In constructing one set of cohort default rate instruments, we assume that the determinants 
of the cost of borrowing is uncorrelated with the unobserved econometric error, 𝜉𝑗𝑠𝑡, but highly 
correlated with cohort default rate. The justification for this assumption is that school’s reputation 
and quality of education across colleges are most likely uncorrelated with the cost of borrowing, 
i.e., inflation rates, interest rates, etc., but these determinants of the cost of borrowing do influence 
the cohort default rate of colleges. In addition, depending on the school type and financial aid 
status, the cost of attending college varies across schools. For example, some schools require 
students to borrow less compared to other schools due to available financial support programs. As 
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such, a change in the determinants of the cost of borrowing is likely to differentially influence the 
cost of attending, and therefore differentially influence cohort default rates across schools. To 
allow for changes in borrowing costs to differentially influence cohort default rates across schools, 
we interact the determinants of borrowing cost with school dummies, and use these interaction 
variables as instruments for cohort default rates. Data on yearly inflation rates are obtained from 
the World Bank Data24 and the federal student loan interest rates extracted from Kantrowitz 
(2020)25. 
 The cost of attending college also depends on the socioeconomic status of students. For 
example, students from high-income households may need less federal, state and school financial 
aid; hence their cost of attending college would be quite different from a student from a low-
income family. By constructing and using as instruments three-way interaction variables of mean 
student characteristics, i.e., average household income, gender, and race, with the determinants of 
borrowing cost and with school dummies, we identify preference parameters governing consumer 
heterogeneity. This way, considering the variation in socioeconomic status, we allow the 
determinants of the cost of borrowing to differentially influence attendance cost across schools 
and across students’ socioeconomic status. 
Parameters in the marginal cost function described in equations (10) and (14) are estimated 
using ordinary least squares. The identification comes from differences across states regarding 
whether they implement the law and differences in timing of implementation. Specifically, we are 
 
24 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=US, accessed (February 18, 2021). 
25 https://www.savingforcollege.com/article/historical-federal-student-interest-rates-and-fees, accessed 
(February 18, 2021). 
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comparing differences in schools’ marginal cost over time in the treated states with differences in 
marginal cost over time in the control states. 
 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Students’ School Choice Model 
Standard economic theory would suggest that rational individuals weigh the marginal cost 
and marginal benefit from defaulting on student loans in order to maximize their utility. The state 
policies of interest, LSD laws, create an additional cost of defaulting on a student loan, and are 
thus expected to increase students’ sensitivity to schools’ cohort default rate in choosing whether 
and which college to attend. We therefore hypothesize that, all else equal, potential students are 
less likely to enroll in colleges with relatively high cohort default rates. 
The first and second columns in Table 3.5 present the coefficient estimates from the linear 
regression of mean utility 𝛿𝑗𝑠𝑡 = log (𝑆𝑗𝑠𝑡) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆0𝑠𝑡) on various school, state and year 
characteristics, which is the standard logit specification of the students’ school choice model. 
Coefficient estimates of the standard logit specification of the school choice model in columns 1 
and 2 of Table 3.5 are obtained using ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation procedures, respectively. The estimates of cohort default rate coefficients across 
columns 1 and 2 are negative as expected, but the OLS and 2SLS estimates of these coefficients 
are of different magnitudes. As mentioned before, cohort default rate is an endogenous variable in 
the school choice model. Hence, OLS estimation in column 1 of Table 3.5 produces biased and 
inconsistent estimate of the cohort default rate coefficient. The 2SLS estimates in column 2 is an 
attempt to address the endogeneity problem of cohort default rate. Furthermore, the Wu-Hausman 
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exogeneity test rejects the exogeneity of cohort default rate at conventional levels of statistical 
significance, and suggests the instruments are necessary. 
Results from the random coefficients logit (RCM) specification of the school choice model 
are represented in columns (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) of Table 3.5. The coefficient estimate for the 
cohort default rate (CDR), as well as the coefficient estimate for the interaction variable, 
𝐿𝑆𝐷 ×  𝐶𝐷𝑅, in the RCM model are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels 
of statistical significance. The negative coefficient estimate for CDR suggests that students are less 
likely to choose to attend schools with relatively high cohort default rates. This finding is consistent 
with Cellini, Darolia, and Turner (2020) which finds that CDR-related sanctions for schools lead 
to large and significant decreases in enrollment. The negative coefficient estimate for 𝐿𝑆𝐷 ×  𝐶𝐷𝑅 
suggests that students making school choice in states with active LSD laws are even more likely 
to avoid schools with relatively high cohort default rates. The results are consistent with our 
hypotheses that, all else equal, potential students are less likely to enroll in colleges with relatively 
high cohort default rates, and active LSD laws serve to magnify this choice behavior of students. 
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Note: The Standard Logit and Random Coefficients Logit models above include controls for state-level per capita income, unemployment rate, and merit scholarship 
status. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
  Standard Logit   Random Coefficients Logit 
 OLS 2SLS  GMM  
Mean Coef Mean Coef 
 
Mean  
Coef Standard Deviations 
                 Demographic  
                   Interactions   
  (𝛼, 𝛽) (𝛼, 𝛽)  (𝛼, 𝛽) (𝜎) (Income) (Gender)          (Race)  
𝐶𝐷𝑅  -2.0241*** -1.3905***  -3.0393*** -1.1523 -0.9907*** -0.3292            -0.1012  
 (0.1747) (0.3364)  (0.4598) (1.4112) (0.1767) (1.0731)         (1.0731)  
         
𝐿𝑆𝐷 ×  𝐶𝐷𝑅  -1.3043*** -1.3539***  -1.4178***     
 (0.3174) (0.5198)  (0.4331)     
         
Constant -1.7490*** -1.7854***  -1.8219*** -2.0813***    
 (0.2207) (0.2216)  (0.3441) (0.1444)    
         
𝐿𝑆𝐷  0.1847*** 0.1683***  0.1751***     
 (0.0327) (0.0396)  (0.0378)     
 
Fixed Effects         
Year yes yes  yes     
School yes yes  yes     
State specific time trend yes yes  yes         
        
Exogeneity Test for Ivs        
        
Wu-Hausman  14168.8413***       
  (p=0.000)       
         
Other Statistics         
GMM    1539.727     
#of observations 21,552 21,552   21,552         
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Column (4) in Table 3.5 reports the parameters that capture student preference variation 
unobserved by the researchers for various school characteristics. In this column, the estimated 
parameter associated with schools’ cohort default rate is statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
preference heterogeneity for the cohort default rate is mostly explained by the included 
demographics. The parameter estimates across columns (5), (6) and (7) reveal that an important 
driver of students’ preference heterogeneity in school choice with respect to cohort default rate is 
their level of household income. Specifically, the negative and statistically significant coefficient 
estimate on the interaction variable of CDR with student household income suggests that students 
from higher-income households have relatively stronger preferences for schools with low cohort 
default rates compared to their low-income peers. Since Wagner (2019) finds evidence that 
financial literacy26 is strongly associated with household income and education, it is not surprising 
that model estimates suggest students from high-income households are more likely to choose 
schools with relatively low cohort default rates. Hoxby and Avery (2012) also find evidence that 
high-income and low-income students have very different college application patterns, even when 
they have similar levels of academic achievement. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate on LSD dummy variable 
suggests that students in states with active LSD laws are more likely to enroll in a four-year college, 
ceteris-paribus. 
Table 3.6 shows the schools’ marginal cost per student, defined in equation (10), before 
and after the implementation of LSD laws. Column (1) of Table 3.6 shows that across the treatment 
states, on average, marginal cost increases significantly after the implementation of the policy. In 
 
26 https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/september/how-americans-rate-financial-literacy, 
accessed (February 18, 2021). 
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column (2) of Table 3.6, we break down the effect of LSD laws on the marginal cost by state.  
Based on the results, except Georgia, we observe an increase in school’s marginal cost after the 
LSD policy adoption by their states. Overall, the results reported in Table 3.6 suggest that it is 
important to consider the impact of LSD laws on schools’ marginal cost when constructing the 
structural equilibrium model. 
 
 Table 3.6 Estimation results for parameters in the marginal cost function 
 (1) (2) 
 Marginal cost Marginal Cost 
On Average 3.720***  
 (1.244)  
   
California (LSD=1)  4.053*** 
  (1.906) 
Georgia (LSD=1)  -4.108** 
  (1.592) 
Hawaii (LSD=1)  9.358*** 
  (1.861) 
Kentucky (LSD=1)  7.465*** 
  (1.82) 
Massachusetts (LSD=1)  1.928 
  (2.777) 
Minnesota (LSD=1)  -1.417 
  (1.662) 
Mississippi (LSD=1)  5.723*** 
  (1.225) 
Montana (LSD=1)  12.43*** 
  (1.164) 
New Jersey (LSD=1)  3.481** 
  (1.208) 
Tennessee (LSD=1)  5.542*** 
  (1.201) 
Texas (LSD=1)  4.527*** 
  (1.342) 
Virginia (LSD=1)  10.83*** 
  (2.097) 
Constant -922.4*** -921.2*** 
 (52.00) (52.75) 
Fixed Effects   
Year yes yes 
School yes yes 
State specific linear time trends yes yes 
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Observations 21,552 21,552 
R-squared 0.133 0.133 
                 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.6.2 Elasticities 
Given the structural school choice model parameter estimates, we compute the 
responsiveness of students’ college enrollment choice with respect to colleges’ cohort default rates. 
Our school choice model yields an average own-school cohort default rate elasticity of -0.1573 
across all schools in the sample; and an average own-school cohort default rate elasticity of -0.1357 
across schools in states with LSD laws. These mean elasticity estimates suggest that students in 
states without LSD laws are on average more sensitive to schools’ cohort default rates compared 
to students in states with active LSD laws. However, an important question is whether students in 
states with active LSD laws become even less sensitive to schools’ cohort default rates if the state’s 
LSD laws were repealed.   
To test our hypothesis that “The absence of LSD laws decreases the “sensitivity” of 
students to cohort default rates when making school enrollment choices,” we conduct a 
counterfactual experiment in which we remove the LSD laws from states that are actively imposing 
the policy in the sample. Table 3.7 shows the results from this counterfactual experiment. Mean 
elasticity estimates in the table reveal that in making their college enrollment decision, students 
become almost 75% more sensitive to schools’ cohort default rate, an elasticity increase in absolute 
terms from 0.0778 to 0.1357, when LSD laws are active compared to if these laws were repealed.  
The results in Table 3.7 suggest that license suspension for default laws increases students’ 
awareness of schools’ cohort default rates when choosing a college. Given that active LSD laws 
serve to increase potential students’ awareness of schools’ cohort default rates when choosing a 
college, these laws could improve timely repayments of student loans.  
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 Table 3.7 Own-school cohort default rate elasticity for schools in states with LSD law 
Description  Mean 
Standard 
Error of Mean Min Max 
Factual 
Elasticity(LSD=1) -0.1357 0.0010 -0.6152 -0.0052 
 
Counterfactual 
Elasticity (LSD=0) -0.0778 0.0005 -0.2839 -0.0003 
 
3.6.3 Equilibrium Counterfactual Analyses 
A useful feature of the full structural model outlined above, which captures both the 
optimizing behavior of students’ school choice and schools’ efforts to influence their cohort default 
rates, is that it can be used for performing equilibrium counterfactual analyses. The following 
equilibrium counterfactual analysis is designed to help us better answer to the following question: 
How are schools’ cohort default rates impacted by their state’s adoption of LSD laws? To answer 
this question, we begin by using the first-order conditions from the optimal cohort default rate-
setting part of our model to recover estimates of the composite components of marginal costs that 
are invariant to schools’ cohort default rates, i.e., re-arranging equation (12) and inserting the 
specified marginal cost function we obtain:  
?̂? = 𝑙𝑛(𝑪𝑫𝑹) + (𝟏 − 𝑪𝑫𝑹) − [𝐈 ∗ 𝚫(𝑪𝑫𝑹, 𝑳𝑺𝑫)]−1 × [𝐈 + 𝚪]𝒔(𝑪𝑫𝑹, 𝑳𝑺𝑫), (16) 
where the right-hand-side of equation (16) is evaluated using the actual values in the data for all 
variables, including 𝑪𝑫𝑹 and 𝑳𝑺𝑫; as well as the parameter estimates from the discrete school 
choice model reported in Table 5. Also, note that the recovered components of marginal cost 
captured by ?̂? are influenced by LSD laws according to the right-hand-side of equation (14), 
𝒄(𝑳𝑺𝑫, 𝝐𝒎𝒄; 𝝀).      
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 Second, with estimates of marginal cost components, ?̂?, in hand, and estimates of marginal 
cost parameters, 𝝀, we purge ?̂? from the impact of LSD laws, to obtain ?̂?𝑳𝑺𝑫=𝟎.  
Third, we counterfactually set the LSD dummy variable to zero in states that have active 
LSD laws, and solve for the new Nash equilibrium set of cohort default rates, 𝑪𝑫𝑹∗, that solves:      
[𝐈 ∗ 𝚫(𝑪𝑫𝑹∗, 𝑳𝑺𝑫 = 𝟎)] × [(𝟏 − 𝑪𝑫𝑹∗) − [−𝑙𝑛(𝑪𝑫𝑹∗) + ?̂?𝑳𝑺𝑫=𝟎]]  
−[𝐈 + Γ]𝒔(𝑪𝑫𝑹∗, 𝑳𝑺𝑫 = 𝟎) = 𝟎    (17) 
A comparison of 𝑪𝑫𝑹 with 𝑪𝑫𝑹∗will reveal the extent to which LSD laws impact schools’ cohort 
default rates.  
 Last, note that the behavioral responses to LSD laws are captured by structural parameters 
𝛾 and 𝛽 from the student school choice side of the structural model (see equation (2)), as well as 
structural parameter vector 𝝀 (see equations (10) and (14)) from the school attribute choice side of 
the structural model. These are the structural parameters that drive the impact of a states’ LSD law 
policy on its equilibrium CDRs. 
 
An Estimate of Socially Optimal Cohort Default Rates 
To help put in context the size of the impact of LSD laws on cohort default rates, we 
approximate socially optimal cohort default rates, 𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐, in the absence of LSD laws by assuming 
a social planner chooses 𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐 to maximize a social welfare function, i.e., the social planner 
solves the following problem:   
max
𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡
{𝑁𝑉(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡) + 𝐸𝑈(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡)},      (18) 
where 𝑁𝑉 = [(1 − 𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡)𝑞𝑗𝑠𝑡 −𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡)𝑞𝑗𝑠𝑡] is the previously described (see equation 
(8)) net value to schools from producing non-defaulting graduates who pursue successful careers; 
and 𝐸𝑈(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡) is the mean expected utility students obtain from the options to acquire college 
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education. Based on the school choice model we previously outlined in section 3.2, 𝐸𝑈(𝐶𝐷𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑡) 




∑ 𝑙𝑛[1 + ∑ exp (
𝐽𝑠𝑡
𝑘=1 𝛿𝑘𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝐷𝑅) + 𝜇𝑖𝑘𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝐷𝑅))]
𝑛𝑠
𝑖=1 ,  (19) 
where equation (19) is the well-known functional form for expected utility obtained from the 
choice options when using a logit model to capture decision-making individuals’ discrete choice 
problem.  
In matrix notation, the system of first-order conditions implied by the optimization problem 
in (18) is the following:  
(𝐈 ∗ 𝚫) × [(𝟏 − 𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐) −𝒎𝒄] − [𝐈 + 𝚪]𝒔(𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐) + 𝚫𝐄𝐔(𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐) = 𝟎  (20) 
where 𝚫𝐄𝐔(∙) is the extra term that appears in the first-order condition because students’ welfare 
is accounted for in the social planner’s optimization problem. 𝚫𝐄𝐔(∙) is a 𝐽 × 1 vector of first-












)𝑛𝑠𝑖=1 . With estimates of the 
LSD-adjusted marginal cost components, ?̂?𝑳𝑺𝑫=𝟎, in hand, we then counterfactually set the LSD 
dummy variable to zero in states that have active LSD laws, and solve for the socially optimal set 
of cohort default rates, 𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐, that solves: 
[𝐈 ∗ 𝚫(𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐, 𝑳𝑺𝑫 = 𝟎)] × [(𝟏 − 𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐) − [−𝑙𝑛(𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐) + ?̂?𝑳𝑺𝑫=𝟎]]  
−[𝐈 + Γ]𝒔(𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐, 𝑳𝑺𝑫 = 𝟎) + 𝚫𝐄𝐔(𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐, 𝑳𝑺𝑫 = 𝟎) = 𝟎  (21) 
The key difference between equation (21) and equation (17) is the added term,  
𝚫𝐄𝐔(𝑪𝑫𝑹𝒔𝒐, 𝑳𝑺𝑫 = 𝟎). 
 
The Impact of LSD laws on Cohort Default Rates  
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To answer “How are schools’ cohort default rates impacted by their state’s adoption of 
LSD laws?”, we conduct a counterfactual in which we switch the value of the LSD dummy from 
1 to 0 and then solve for the cohort default rates that satisfy the first-order conditions shown in 
equation (17).  
Table 3.8 shows by state with LSD laws, the mean factual observed CDR, the mean 
counterfactual predicted Nash equilibrium CDR where we consider the behavioral responses of 
both schools and students to the implementation of LSD laws, “CDR_Nash_student_school”, and 
the mean predicted percentage change in CDR. In addition, we report the counterfactual predicted 
Nash equilibrium CDRs where we only consider the behavioral response of students to the 
implementation of LSD laws, “CDR_Nash_student.”  
 
 Table 3.8 State level CDR, predicted Nash CDR and percent changes 




























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
California 0.0503 0.0558 0.0489 10.84 -2.79 
    (0.0362) (0.0297) 
Georgia 0.0697 0.0717 0.0859 2.86 23.35 
    (0.1407) (0.2155) 
Hawaii 0.0632 0.0748 0.0604 18.27 -4.52 
    (0.1356) (0.1179) 
Kentucky 0.0683 0.0942 0.0715 37.86 4.69 
    (0.085) (0.0767) 
Massachusetts 0.0432 0.0458 0.0438 6.13 1.47 
    (0.0631) (0.0506) 
Minnesota 0.0326 0.0458 0.0557 40.67 71.12 
    (0.1004) (0.072) 
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Mississippi 0.0728 0.107 0.0888 46.91 21.93 
    (0.1313) (0.1327) 
Montana 0.0624 0.0886 0.1214 41.94 94.39 
    (0.1222) (0.2996) 
New Jersey 0.0504 0.0723 0.0563 43.45 11.72 
    (0.0748) (0.0596) 
Tennessee 0.0714 0.0999 0.0762 39.89 6.67 
    (0.0677) (0.0422) 
Texas 0.0776 0.0895 0.0742 15.38 -4.33 
    (0.0517) (0.0392) 
Virginia 0.0464 0.051 0.0415 9.9 -10.64 
    (0.0714) (0.057) 
Overall Means 
0.059 0.0747 0.0687 26.18 17.75 
      (0.2731) (0.3645) 
Note: Standard error of mean percentage change in parentheses.  
 
Overall, across the treatment states, model-predicted percent change in the last row and last 
column of Table 3.8 shows that implementation of LSD laws served to decrease CDRs of schools 
by a mean 17.75%. But this overall mean decline masks the mixed state-by-state results. Model-
predicted percent changes throughout the last column in Table 3.8, column (5), reveal that the LSD 
law policy implementation has mixed results on CDRs by state. Across the twelve treated states, 
the model predicts that implementation of LSD laws served to increase schools’ CDRs in 
California, Hawaii, Texas and Virginia by a mean 5.57%. While in Georgia, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Tennessee and New Jersey, the model predicts 
that implementation of LSD laws served to decrease schools’ CDRs by a mean 29.42%.  
In column (4) of Table 3.8, we consider model-predicted percent changes in CDR when 
only students respond to the LSD law policy. Based on results in column (4), CDRs decline 
unanimously across states by a mean 26.18% in response to the LSD law policy when we only 
consider students’ response to the policy.  
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A comparison of the results in column (4) and column (5) clearly shows that it is important 
to consider both students’ and schools’ responses to the LSD laws policy. The comparison reveals 
that, in some states, schools’ response to the policy counters and dominates the response of 
students, leading to higher CDRs. In contrast, in other states, students’ response to the policy 
dominates schools’ response, leading to the policy-intended goal of reducing CDRs.  
Figure 3.2 shows time series plots of the factual observed CDR (“CDR”), the 
counterfactual predicted Nash equilibrium CDRs (“CDR_Nash_student school” and 
“CDR_Nash_student”), and estimated social welfare maximizing CDR in the absence of LSD laws 
(“CDR_SW”) for schools in Texas, Virginia, Minnesota, and New Jersey. The vertical line in each 
time series plot shows the specific time period in which the relevant state implemented their LSD 
laws.  
As an example of states in which our model predicts implementation of LSD law policy 
served to increase CDRs, we report time series plots for Texas and Virginia. The time series plots 
for Texas and Virginia clearly show that the implementation of LSD laws increased cohort default 
rates of schools (“CDR” compared to “CDR_Nash_student_school”). One way to interpret this 
result is that LSD laws served to increase the marginal cost per student schools face to reduce their 
CDR; therefore, facing higher marginal costs, schools optimally choose to marginally lower 
resources channeled towards decreasing their CDRs. Lowered efforts of schools to support 
initiatives that subsidize the cost students face of acquiring education will increase the likelihood 
of student loan defaults since students will increasingly need to borrow to finance their education. 
On the other hand, the time series plots for Texas and Virginia show that if the equilibrium model 
only focuses on student’s response to the LSD policy (“CDR_Nash_student”), our model predicts 
that implementation of the LSD policy unambiguously serves to lower CDRs. Interestingly, the 
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plots for Texas and Virginia show that the LSD policy served to increase CDRs even higher than 
our estimate of socially optimal levels of cohort default rates.  
 
 
 Figure 3.2 Factual Observed CDR (“CDR”), Counterfactual Predicted CDR considering only Students’ 
response (“CDR_Nash_student”), Counterfactual Predicted CDR considering Students’ & Schools’ 
responses (“CDR_Nash_student_school”), and Estimated Social Welfare Maximizing CDR in the absence 






      
                            Figure 3.2 Contd. 
 
Time series plots for schools located in Minnesota and New Jersey are examples in which 
our model predicts implementation of LSD law policy served to decrease CDRs. Comparing the 
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time series plot of actual CDR to the time series plot of “CDR_Nash_student_school” in these 
diagrams clearly show that LSD laws decreased cohort default rates in these two states. As the 
proponents of LSD laws expect, in these states, the threat of losing a state or occupational license 
is a sufficiently powerful incentive for borrowers to keep up with loan repayments and avoid 
default on their student loans. Interestingly, the plots for Minnesota and New Jersey show that 
LSD law policy decreased CDRs even lower than our estimate of socially optimal levels of cohort 
default rates. 
Overall, once we consider the behavioral responses of both schools and students, it is not 
surprising to find mixed results of the impact of LSD laws on cohort default rates. Indeed, the 
relative magnitude of schools’ and students’ responses to the policy implementation determines 
the impact of LSD laws on cohort default rates, a feature and result of LSD policy that have not 
been studied and documented in the literature. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
We have shown how the implementation of state laws that deny, revoke, or suspend state 
licenses due to student loan default changes schools’ cohort default rates and student’s college 
choice. Using a structural econometric model, this paper provides answers to the following 
questions: (i) To what extent do cohort default rates of colleges influence students’ school 
enrollment choice, and how does LSD law policy further influence this relationship? and (ii) How 
are schools’ cohort default rates impacted by their state’s adoption of LSD laws? The empirical 
methodology begins with estimating preference parameters in a structural econometric model of 
students’ college choice. With the preference parameter estimates in hand, we then performed 
counterfactual policy analyses in which we artificially repeal the LSD laws from adopting states 
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in the equilibrium model and measure the model-predicted changes in schools’ CDRs and student’s 
sensitivity to CDRs in their college decisions.  
Regarding an answer to question (i) above, our empirical finding suggests that a colleges’ 
cohort default rate negatively influences students’ choice of attending the college. Furthermore, 
mean elasticity estimates from our school choice model reveal that in making their college 
enrollment choice, students become almost 75% more sensitive to schools’ cohort default rate 
when LSD laws are active compared to if these laws were repealed. Our model estimates also 
suggest that the socioeconomic status of students plays a significant role in their college choice. 
Based on our findings, students from high-income households have a stronger preference for 
enrolling in colleges with relatively lower cohort default rates compared to their low-income 
household peers. 
Even though LSD laws increase students’ awareness of cohort default rates when making 
a college choice, the impact of LSD laws on cohort default rates is not only determined by students’ 
response to the policy but also by schools’ response. In fact, we find that schools’ response to the 
LSD policy tends to counter students’ response, a feature of LSD policy that has not been studied 
and documented in the literature. Thus, the relative strength of the behavioral responses of students 
and schools will determine the impact of the LSD policy on CDRs. Regarding an answer to 
question (ii) above, our empirical findings suggest that the LSD policy has mixed results on cohort 
default rates: In some states, schools’ response to the policy counters and dominates students’ 
response, causing an increase in these states cohort default rates by a mean 5.57%. While, in other 
states, students’ response to the LSD policy counters and dominates schools’ response, causing 
cohort default rates to decrease by a mean 29.42%.  
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From a policy efficacy perspective, LSD laws alter students’ college decisions by 
increasing their sensitivity to schools with high cohort default rates. Hence, considering students’ 
response to LSD law policy, the policy can improve timely repayments of student loans, which 
reduces CDRs. On the other hand, the impact of LSD laws on cohort default rates is not only 
determined by students’ response to the policy but also by schools’ response. Thus, the relative 
strength of the behavioral responses of students and schools will determine the policy’s ultimate 
effect on CDRs. Therefore, we recommend policymakers consider both students’ and schools’ 
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This Appendix contains three tables (Table A.1-Table A.3). Table A.1 presents the manufacturers and their available brands in year 2012. Table A.2 reports the results assessing the impact of manufacturer’s 
characteristics on manufacturer’s bargaining power under Assumption 2 where each retailer carrying PL contracts with a unique outside manufacturer. Table A.3 shows the results assessing the impact 
of manufacturer’s characteristics on manufacturer’s variable profit, mean price-cost margins and quantity sold under Assumption 2 where each retailer carrying PL contracts with a unique outside 
manufacturer. 
 
 Table A.1: Manufacturers and their available brands in year 2012 
Manufacturer’s Name Manufacturer’s Brands 
Alpina Productos Alimenticious Alpina 
  Alpina Revive 
Cascade Fresh Amande 
  Cascade Fresh 
Chobani Inc. Chobani 
Dean Foods Dean Land O Lakes 
Emmi Roth USA Inc.  Emmi 
Fage USA Dairy Industry Inc Fage Total 
General Mills Inc. Yoplait 
 Yoplait Greek 
 Yoplait Light 
 Yoplait Light Thick and Creamy 
 Yoplait Original 
 Yoplait Thick and Creamy 
  Yoplait Vivant 
Greece by Tyras S A Olympus 
Green Mountain Creamery Green Mountain Creamery 
Green Valley Organics Green Valley Organics 
Group Dannon Brown Cow 
 Dannon 
 Dannon Activia Selects 
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 Dannon All Natural 
 Dannon Light and Fit 
 Stonyfield Farm 
 Stonyfield Organic 
 YoCrunch 
  YoCrunch Fruit Parfait 
H P Hood Inc AxelRod 
  Crowley 
Johanna Foods Inc La Yogurt 
  La Yogurt Custard Classics 
Kalona Organics Cultural Evolution 
Liberty Products Inc. Liberte 
  Liberte Mediterranee 
Maple Hill Creamery Maple Hill Creamery 
Mehadrin Dairy Corp Mehadrin 
  Mehadrin Fit N Free 
National Dairy Holdings LaLa 
  Weight Watchers 
Prairie Farms Dairy Prairie Farms 
Private Label Private Label 
Redwood Hill Farm Redwood Hill Farm 
Schreiber Foods Inc Schreiber Lactaid 
Springfield Creamery Inc Nancys 
The Hain Celestial Group Inc Almond Dream 
  The Greek Gods 
Tillamook County Creamery Tillamook 
Tula Foods Inc Better Whey of Life 
Turtle Mountain Inc So Delicious 
Wallaby Yogurt Company Inc Wallaby Down Under 
  Wallaby Organic 
WhiteWave Foods Company Silk Live 
















 (1) (2)  
Model 1 Model 2 
   




Product Line Depth (Average)  -0.0114 
  (0.0186) 
Product Line Width -0.0167 -0.0288 
 (0.0349) (0.0285) 
Constant 1.068*** 1.093*** 
 (0.104) (0.134) 
   
Observations 29 29 
R-squared 0.057 0.055 






 Table A.3: Variable profit, Quantity sold and Price-cost Margins as a function of manufacturer’s characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




       
Product line depth (maximum) 41.23  1,738  0.0292**  
 (33.65)  (1,195)  (0.0121)  
Product line depth (average)  83.44*  3,326*  0.0460** 
  (47.13)  (1,669)  (0.0171) 
Product line width  20.91 76.08 1,050 3,400 0.0149 0.0555** 
 (91.38) (72.23) (3,246) (2,558) (0.0329) (0.0261) 
Constant -1,941*** -2,217*** -76,337*** -86,911*** -0.853*** -0.975*** 
 (271.4) (340.8) (9,642) (12,067) (0.0976) (0.123) 
       
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.099 0.150 0.139 0.193 0.299 0.330 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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